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A basic principle in the law of payment by check is that the customer does not 
bear the risk of payments made over a forgery of the customer’s signature.  Section 4-401 
of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a bank may charge to the customer’s 
account any item that is “properly payable.”  The current version of section 4-401 goes 
on to state that an item is properly payable if the item is “authorized by the customer and 
is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and the bank.”  Although 
formally the Article 4 provisions say only that the bank may charge the account for any 
item that is properly payable, the inverse proposition—that if an item is not payable then 
the bank may not change the customer’s account—is routinely taken to be both true and a 
basic principle of the Article 4 scheme.1  Equally clear is the basic proposition that a 
check bearing a forgery of the drawer’s signature is not properly payable.2
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 U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (“An item containing a forged drawer’s signature or forged 
indorsement is not properly payable.”).  Citations to Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. are to 
2If the drawer is an organization of any size, manual signatures on checks will not 
be feasible.  Accordingly the routine practice is that a check drawn by an organization 
will bear a facsimile signature.  The customer and bank will enter into an agreement 
authorizing the bank to honor checks bearing the facsimile signature.  Several recent 
cases concerning the effect of such resolutions raise significant issues about the basic loss 
allocation scheme for the check system.
I.  FORGED FACSIMILE SIGNATURE CASES
In Jefferson Parish School Board v. First Commerce Bank,3 a drawer’s action 
against the drawee bank for paying checks over forged drawer’s signature failed where 
the drawer had signed a resolution concerning the use of facsimile signatures.  According 
to the resolution, the bank was authorized to honor any checks which bore or purported to 
bear the facsimile signature of the authorized parties, “regardless of by whom or by what 
means the actual or purported facsimile signature or signatures thereon may have been 
affixed thereto, if such facsimile signature or signatures resemble the facsimile 
specimens” on file with the bank.4 The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the bank, on the grounds that the resolution was effective and under 
the resolution there was no factual issue concerning the bank’s authority to charge the 
customer’s account.
the current version, including the major changes made in 1990.  The prior version is cited 
as Former U.C.C.
3
 669 So.2d 1298 (La. App. 1996)
4 Id. at 1300.
3According to the Jefferson Parish opinion, the only issue posed was whether the 
resolution was effective.  The Court treated this issue under section 4-103(1), which 
provides that 
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement, 
but the parties to the agreement cannot disclaim a bank's responsibility for 
its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the 
measure of damages for the lack or failure. However, the parties may 
determine by agreement the standards by which the bank's responsibility is 
to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Though the court did not discuss the point in any detail, its conclusion seems to have 
been that the agreement either did not disclaim the bank’s responsibility to exercise 
ordinary care, or that it established a standard of care which was not manifestly 
unreasonable, to wit, that the bank was authorized to pay checks that bore a signature 
which “resembled” the authorized signature.5
The Jefferson Parish case does not state explicitly how the malefactor produced 
the bogus checks.  In general, one can imagine two versions of the bogus facsimile check 
scenario.  In the first category are cases in which the malefactor produces the bogus 
checks by getting access to the machine used to produce genuine checks.  In the second 
category are cases in which the malefactor produces bogus checks without in any fashion 
making unauthorized use of the facsimile signature machine or any other facilities under 
the control of the actual drawer.  Such cases are probably increasingly common because 
modern desktop publishing technology makes it a fairly simple matter for a malefactor to 
produce a bogus check, using a genuine check as a model, even though the malefactor did 
not gain any access to the machine used to produce genuine facsimile signed checks.  It 
5 Id.
4appears that Jefferson Parish was a case of the second sort, for the report indicates that 
the customer contended that the bank would be unable to produce any evidence of 
negligence on the drawer’s part in safeguarding blank checks or the facsimile signature 
machine.  Of course, under the court’s view of the law, that fact made no difference.  
However the bogus checks were produced, the bank was authorized by the resolution to 
honor them, so long as, in the language of the resolution, the signature “resembled” an 
authorized facsimile signature.
The distinction between bogus facsimile signature checks produced with and 
without any unauthorized access to the facsimile signature machine does not appear to 
have been discussed in any of the cases dealing with forged facsimile signatures, yet it 
may well play an important role in the law.
The modern story of facsimile signature fraud begins with the well-known case of 
Perini Corp. v. First National Bank.6   Checks bearing the facsimile signature of an 
authorized representative of the drawer, Perini Corp., were made payable to "Quisenberry 
Contracting Co." and "Southern Contracting Co."  The checks were indorsed in the name 
of one "Jesse D. Quisenberry" and in that form were accepted for collection by the 
depository bank, the First National Bank of Habersham County, Georgia.  The checks 
were forwarded for payment to the payor banks, Brown Brothers, Harriman & Company 
and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, and were paid.  When Perini Corp 
discovered the unauthorized payments, it bought suit against the banks.7  The case is 
6
 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977).
7
 Perini entered into an agreement with one of the drawee banks, Brown Brothers, that it 
would assert no claim against that bank but could assert the bank's claims against other 
5known primarily for its treatment of the so-called "double forgery" issue.  Inasmuch the 
checks were deposited with an indorsement that differed from the designation of the 
payee, it was possible to treat them as bearing a forged indorsement.  If so, then it was 
arguable that the depository banks bore the loss.  By contrast if one ignored the 
discrepancy between the name of the payee and the indorsement, then the significant flaw 
in the checks was the forgery of the signature of the drawer, Perini Corp., in which case 
the loss would ordinarily be borne by the payor bank.
In the Perini case itself, however, there was little doubt that if the principal defect 
in the checks was the signature of the drawer, the loss would be borne by the drawer 
rather than the payor bank.  The agreement between the drawer and the payor banks 
authorizing the use of the facsimile signature machine provided that the payor banks were
authorized to pay and charge to the customer's account any checks "bearing or purporting 
to bear the single facsimile signature" of the designated officer of Perini, "regardless of 
by whom or by what means the actual or purported facsimile signature thereon may have 
been affixed thereto, if such facsimile signature resembles the facsimile specimen."8  The 
drawer did not dispute the contention that if the unauthorized signature of Perini were 
treated as the only defect in the checks, then the agreement covered the question of 
liability as between the bank and its customer, and the agreement was enforceable.9
parties in the suit.  The other drawee bank, Morgan Guaranty, did not enter into such an 
agreement.  553 F.2d at 402 n.2.
8
 553 F.2d at 400.
9
 553 F.2d at 403 ("One answer is clear, however. Perini has no recourse on the 
unauthorized signature of R. A. Munroe against Morgan or Brown Brothers. Perini's 
resolution authorizing the drawees' payment of checks bearing signatures resembling the 
machine-embossed facsimile signature precludes that course of action.  Perini makes no 
contrary contention.")
6Accordingly, the case gives relatively little information about how the checks were 
produced.  It appears, however, that the wrongdoer gained access to the check forms and 
facsimile signature machine from the drawer.   The opinion does note that
The precautions taken by Perini to safeguard against abuse of the 
machine are much in dispute. Pre-printed company checks may or may not 
have been left in an unlocked cabinet. Operation of the machine itself 
required three different keys, but Perini may or may not have kept those 
keys in separate hands. 
In any event, sometime prior to September 7, 1971, someone stole 
a number of pre-printed Perini checks and gained access to the signature 
machine or developed a perfect copy of the facsimile signature it 
produced.10
In Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Girard Bank,11 a credit union maintained a 
checking account with a commercial bank pursuant to a facsimile signature agreement 
providing that the bank was authorized to honor checks "bearing or purporting to bear the 
facsimile signature or any signature or signatures resembling the facsimile specimens … 
with the same effect as if the signature or signatures were manual signatures."12  Five 
checks drawn on the account were honored by the drawee bank.  Significantly, all five 
bore the same check number, the same date, and were made out for the same amount.  
When the problem was discovered the customer brought suit to force the bank to recredit 
its account.  The drawee bank defended on the basis of the resolution authorizing it to 
honor any checks purporting to bear the facsimile signature.  
In a somewhat less than satisfying opinion, the court held that the exculpatory
provisions in the agreement were not effective to save the drawee bank from liability.  
10
 553 F.2d at 403.
11
 522 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
12
 522 F. Supp. at 416.
7The court began with the proposition that under Pennsylvania law an exculpatory 
agreement is to be construed strictly against the drafting party.  Then, the court proceeded
to find, or perhaps create, ambiguities in the agreement.  First the court suggested that the 
coverage of the agreement was ambiguous as between an unauthorized use of the actual 
facsimile signature machine or a signature created without the use of the machine.13
Then, the court suggested that the language of the agreement saying that the facsimile 
signature could be treated by the bank as having "the same effect as if the signature or 
signatures were manual signatures" might be read as meaning that the signature was 
effective only if genuine.14  Ultimately, the court concluded that the agreement was 
sufficiently ambiguous that the liability of the bank should be determined under the 
general principles under which the bank bears responsibility for an authorized check.15
While the opinion in Cumis is far from satisfying, the result is not without appeal.  
Inasmuch as multiple checks bearing the same check number were presented, it is 
extremely unlikely that the fraud was committed by an unauthorized use of the facsimile 
13
 Presumably that is what the court has in mind by its reference to "either the 
unauthorized use of the genuine facsimile stamp or a forged facsimile stamp."  522 F. 
Supp. at 421.
14
 Id.
15 Cumis was followed in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Mellon Bank, 43 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 928 (W.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d mem. 162 F.3d 1151 (3rd Cir. 1998).  The district 
court opinion in Kaiser is at least as unsatisfying as the Cumis opinion.  One can 
conclude from it only that the court did not like the exculpatory provision concerning the 
facsimile signature.  Just how the court got from that point to the conclusion that the 
agreement was unenforceable is rather unclear.  It is, however, worth noting that so far as 
appears from the opinion, the forged facsimile signature checks may well have been 
produced by an outsider.  The opinion does note that “the only evidence in the record 
concerning the conduct of Kaiser is the evidence adduced by Kaiser which clearly 
supports the inference that no one involved with it in any way failed to exercise ordinary 
care that substantially contributed to the making of the forged signatures on the checks.”  
43 UCC Rep. Serv. at 933.
8signature machine, as appears to have been the case in Perini.  At the very least, the 
wrongdoer in Cumis must have produced multiple copies of a single check, though it is 
not clear from the facts whether the wrongdoer produced those copies from a check that 
was actually issued by the drawer and bore a genuine facsimile signature, or from a single 
blank original purloined from the drawer.
In most of the cases upholding agreements absolving the drawee bank from 
responsibility for paying a check bearing a facsimile it seems clear from the facts that the 
wrongdoer produced the checks by unauthorized use of the actual facsimile machine.  For 
example, the pre-Code case of Phoenix Die Casting Co. v. Manufacturers and Traders 
Trust Co.,16 was a double forgery case essentially equivalent to the well-known Perini
case.  A check bearing what appeared to be an authorized facsimile signature of 
Phoenix’s officer Braun, was made payable to Braun himself.  Apparently the malefactor 
produced the check and supplied the forged indorsement of Braun as payee.  The check 
was paid by the drawee bank.  The drawer’s action against the drawee bank failed on the 
ground that the facsimile signature agreement authorized the drawee bank to pay any 
checks bearing the facsimile signature of an authorized signer, regardless of who caused 
that facsimile signature to be placed on the check.  It is clear that the malefactor produced 
the bogus check by gaining unauthorized access to blank checks and the facsimile 
machine.  As the opinion notes, “the affidavits and documents in the record demonstrate 
conclusively that the facsimile signature was not affixed by Braun but by an employee of 
16
 289 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1968)(applying pre-Code law).
9the plaintiff who acted without authority and committed a criminal act by drawing the 
check.”17
So too, the post-Code cases that approve the use of resolutions placing on the 
drawer the risk of loss from forged facsimile signatures appear to involve “insider” fraud.  
In Wilmington Trust Co. v. Phoenix Steel Corp.,18 Phoenix Steel maintained an account 
with Wilmington Trust pursuant to a facsimile signature agreement that authorized the 
bank to pay any checks bearing a facsimile signature of certain designated officials.  The 
appellate court ruled that summary judgment should have been granted for the bank 
dismissing the drawer’s action against the bank for having paid checks bearing an 
unauthorized facsimile signature.  It was undisputed that the malefactor was an employee 
of the drawer who had obtained access to blank checks and the facsimile signature 
machine. Similarly, in Wall v. Hamilton County Bank,19 summary judgment for the 
drawee bank was affirmed where the bank paid checks bearing facsimile signatures.  
Indeed, in Wall in appeared that the facsimile signature may have been placed on blank 
checks by an authorized person and the checks were then stolen from the drawer.20
In Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. NationsBank, N.A.,21 the drawee bank paid 
twenty-seven checks bearing the forgery of the drawer’s facsimile signature.  The 
facsimile signature agreement authorized the bank to honor checks “when bearing or 
purporting to bear” the facsimile signature of an authorized official of the drawer, and 
17
 289 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
18
 273 A.2d 266 (Del. 1971).
19
 276 So.2d 182 (Fla. App. Ct. 1973).
20 Id. at 182.
21
 212 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2000).
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provided that the customer agreed that any such facsimile signature “will be effective as 
[the customer’s] signature regardless of whether the person affixing it was authorized to 
do so.”22 An agreed motion for summary judgment posed only the issue of whether the 
agreement was effective to shift the loss from the bank to the drawer.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the agreement was effective, and remanded for further proceedings on 
the issue—not encompassed by the parties’ stipulations on the summary judgment 
motion—of whether the bank exercised ordinary care in paying the forged checks.  
Although the facts were not developed in detail, it appears that the malefactor was an 
insider.  The court notes in a footnote that “each check bore a different serial number 
corresponding to actual FPL checks that FPL had internally voided or canceled through 
its check production process without notice to Nationsbank.”23  It seems inconceivable 
that anyone other than an insider could have known what check numbers to use to avoid 
detection.
In the insider fraud cases, that is, cases in which the wrongdoing was attributable 
to some failure in the customer's internal procedures for safeguarding the facsimile 
machine, the result would presumably be the same even if there were no resolution 
absolving the bank from liability for honoring checks bearing facsimile signatures.  
Section 3-406 provides that "[a] person whose failure to exercise ordinary care 
substantially contributes to … the making of a forged signature on an instrument is 
precluded from asserting … the forgery against a person who, in good faith, pays the 
instrument …."  In a forged facsimile signature case not involving a specific resolution 
22 Id. at 1227.
23 Id. at 1228 n.3.
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concerning the use of the facsimile signature machine, the drawer would contend that the 
signature was unauthorized.  The drawee bank would respond that customer's own 
conduct had substantially contributed to the making of the unauthorized signature and 
therefore the customer is precluded from denying the authenticity of the signature under 
the basic rule of section 3-406.  Indeed, the comments to section 3-406 state that "the 
most obvious case" of negligence triggering the preclusion rule "is that of a drawer who 
makes use of a signature stamp or other automatic signing device and is negligent in 
looking after it."  Thus, the effect of an agreement that the drawee bank is permitted to 
pay checks bearing facsimile signatures is only to resolve, in advance, what would be a 
fairly straightforward issue of negligence.
Thus, the significant cases are the outsider fraud cases, in which the wrongdoing 
is not attributable to any lapse of security within the organization of the drawer.  In this 
category, the only clear rulings are those in the Cumis and Jefferson Parish cases.  The 
opinion in Cumis, based on a somewhat tendentious reading of the facsimile signature 
resolution, is not particularly appealing on its own terms.  By contrast, the Jefferson 
Parish opinion seems to be very much in the tradition of forged facsimile signature case 
decisions.  Yet if we confine our attention to the outsider fraud scenario, the result and 
approach in Jefferson Parish raises more problematic issues about the basic principles of 
loss allocation for the check system, or, indeed, for payment systems generally. 
If we take seriously the approach taken in Jefferson Parish, then the only limit on 
the enforceability of an agreement shifting to the customer the loss resulting from 
payment over a forgery of a drawer’s facsimile signature is the rule of section 4-103(a), 
which provides that:
12
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement 
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own 
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the 
measure of damages for such lack or failure; but the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to be 
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
This section imposes two limits on variation by agreement:  First, an agreement 
cannot disclaim responsibility for a failure to exercise ordinary care.  Second, an 
agreement cannot disclaim responsibility for a lack of good faith. It is unclear 
whether this limitation imposes any particular stringent limitations on an 
agreement disclaiming responsibility for payment of facsimile signed checks.  
The concept that an agreement cannot disclaim responsibility for failure to 
exercise ordinary care seems to present little obstacle to the enforceability of 
facsimile signature agreements.  The basic issue under consideration is not who 
bears the loss of unauthorized signatures where someone was at fault.  Rather the 
issue is who bears the loss in the case where no one was at fault, or, at least, 
where the loss could not have been prevented by the bank conducting its check 
payment operations in the ordinary fashion.  Indeed, the Article 3 definition of 
“ordinary care” makes quite clear that there is no invariable statutory requirement 
of particular action by a bank in the conduct of check payment operations.  
Section 3-103(a)(7) provides that 
"Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in business means 
observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in 
which the person is located, with respect to the business in which the 
person is engaged.  In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for 
processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable 
commercial standards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if 
the failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures 
and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking 
usage not disapproved by this Article or Article 4. 
13
The comments indicate that the specific provision that ordinary care does not invariably
require manual examination is intended primarily to address the sequential forgery rules 
set out in section 4-406.  But there is nothing in the text to suggest that the definition is 
limited to that scenario.  Rather we have a general definition of “ordinary care” that 
explicitly rejects any notion that the concept can serve as a statutory basis for imposing a
requirement of manual examination of instruments where that is not the customary 
practice.
It is also far from clear whether the requirement of good faith imposes any 
significant limitations on facsimile signature agreements.  According to section 4-
104(c), the Article 3 definition of “good faith” applies in Article 4.  Section 3-
103(a)(4) defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”  It would be hard to argue that 
an agreement in which a bank disclaims responsibility for forged facsimile 
signatures violated the requirement of “honesty in fact.”  The core of that concept 
seems to be consistency between word and deed.  For example, difficult issues 
might be posed where a party seizes upon general language in an agreement to 
authorize action that the parties probably never had in mind in drafting the 
provision in question.  A disclaimer of liability for forgery seems to raise no such 
problems.  Such an agreement would not be a subterfuge, but would be intended 
to mean precisely what it says, and would have been drafted for precisely the
scenario under consideration.
The content of the second aspect of the good faith definition—observance 
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing—is unclear.  As the comments 
14
makes clear, the requirement of good faith does not impose a general requirement 
of conduct consistent with ordinary practice of others in a similar situation.  The 
requirement is not a general requirement of “observance of reasonable 
commercial standards,” it is only a requirement of observance of reasonable 
commercial standards “of fair dealing.”  Standing alone, it is not immediately 
obvious that a disclaimer of liability is a violation of concepts of “fair dealing.”  
Indeed the many cases upholding exculpatory provisions in facsimile signature 
agreements seem to suggest that no substantial issue of “fair dealing” is presented.
Let us tentatively assume that the requirements of good faith and ordinary care do 
not impose significant limitations on agreements disclaiming responsibility for forgery of 
the drawer’s signature and consider the consequences.  The usual form of facsimile 
signature agreement absolves the drawee bank of responsibility for paying a check 
bearing a forgery of an authorized facsimile signature so long as th e signature on the 
check “resembles” a genuine signature on file with the bank.24 Is the requirement that the 
signature “resemble” an authorized signature necessary to the effectiveness of the 
agreement?  If one assumes that it is the routine practice of payor bank’s to conduct a 
manual examination of checks before making final payment, the requirement of 
“resemblance” might make some sense.  If a bogus facsimile signature were so poorly 
produced that any ordinary physical examination would have raised questions about its 
authenticity, and the routine practice of payor banks were to conduct such an 
examination, then it might make sense to say that a bank’s payment of a check bearing a 
24 See., e.g., Jefferson Parish, 669 So.2d at 1300; Perini, 553 F.2d at 400; Cumis, 522 F. 
Supp. at 416.
15
crude, easily-detectable forgery of the facsimile signature was not a payment made in the 
exercise of ordinary care.  Yet it is by now widely known that payor banks do not 
regularly conduct a manual examination of checks in the payment process.  Some degree 
of sampling may be routine, but it is certainly not the case that all checks are subject to 
individual examination.  Thus, it is hard to see why it should be essential to the 
effectiveness of a facsimile signature agreement that it be limited to cases in which the 
signature “resembles” the genuine facsimile signature.
If one concludes that the common limitation of “resemblance” in facsimile 
signature agreements is not necessary to effectiveness of the agreement, what of the 
requirement that the check bear any facsimile signature at all?  Suppose a facsimile 
signature agreement provided that the bank would not be responsible for payment of any 
check provided that the MICR encoding correctly identified the payor bank and the 
account.25  Could one say that the agreement violated section 4-103(a) by disclaiming the 
bank’s obligation of good faith and ordinary care?  It is a bit hard to see why.  To be sure, 
the payor bank could still conduct whatever degree of random manual examination it felt 
prudent.  If the bank examined the check, found no signature, but went ahead and paid 
the check, it would not be difficult to conclude that that bank had failed to exercise 
ordinary care.  But that is a trivial case.26  If the check in question happens to be one of 
25
 The MICR line on a check routinely identifies the amount of the check as well as the 
payor bank and the account; however it has long been clear that a check can be properly 
payable even though the account balance is not sufficient to cover the amount of the 
check.  U.C.C. § 4-401(a).
26
 Moreover, the agreement could easily be modified to deal with this case.  The 
agreement could provide that the bank will not be liable for paying any check with the 
correct MICR encoding, unless the check was paid as a result of a failure by the bank to 
exercise ordinary care.   
16
the few selected for manual examination, the payor bank will notice the absence of the 
signature and presumably will dishonor the check.  Saying that the bank might be liable if 
it does manually examine and pays despite the absence of any signature is a matter of 
little importance.  The issue is whether the bank would be liable in the case where no 
manual examination of the particular check was conducted.   If the agreement provides 
that the bank is not liable in such a case, and if the bank’s conduct in paying that check 
did not “vary unreasonably from general banking usage,”27 it is not immediately obvious 
why that fact that the particular check lacked a signature should make any difference.  By 
hypothesis the fact that the check should not have been paid would not have been 
detected by an ordinarily prudent bank whether it bore a perfect forgery of the facsimile 
signature, a crude forgery of the facsimile signature, or no facsimile signature at all.
Once one sees that the common provision in facsimile signature agreements that 
the bank can charge the account for any item bearing a signature that “resembles” an 
authorized facsimile signature is unnecessary, the question naturally arise whether the 
fact that the drawer has authorized the use of a facsimile signature makes any difference.  
Suppose that the customer has not authorized facsimile signatures.  The account, for 
example, might be an ordinary personal checking account where facsimile signatures are 
uncommon.  Suppose that the agreement provided that the bank would not be liable for 
paying any check bearing the correct MICR code for the payor bank and the account.  
Would that agreement be enforceable, at least in the case in which the particular check 
was one of the many that was not subject to random manual inspection under the bank’s 
customary practice?  If we take the approach of the facsimile check cases seriously, it is 
27
 U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7).
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hard to see why the agreement should not be enforceable.  By hypothesis we are dealing 
with cases of forgery that could not have been prevented by the bank’s exercise of its 
ordinary spot check procedures.  If the only limitation on the enforceability of facsimile 
signature agreements is the weak requirement of section 4-103 that an agreement cannot 
disclaim responsibility for a lack of good faith and ordinary care, then it is hard to see 
why the principle of those cases is not equally applicable to cases that do not involve 
facsimile signatures, or to cases where the check in question bears no signature at all.
Thus far, we have confined our attention to cases in which the drawer’s signature 
was forged.  Let us also consider cases in which the drawer draws a genuine check and 
sends it off toward the payee, but the check is stolen before arriving at the payee.  The 
scalawag forges the indorsement of the payee and initiates collection.  Since the payee is 
not a customer of the payor bank, that bank would have no way of knowing anything 
about the signature of the payee, and so would be expected to pay the check.   Under 
section 4-401 the payor bank can charge the item to the customer’s account if it is 
“properly payable.”  It is perfectly well settled that if a payor bank pays a check bearing a 
forged indorsement, it has not followed its customer’s instruction and the amount of the 
check cannot be charged to the customer’s account.28  Suppose, however, that an 
agreement between a payor bank and its customer were to provide that the bank would 
not be liable for payment of checks bearing forged indorsement.  Would such an 
agreement be enforceable?  If, as the Jefferson Parish case suggests, the only limit on 
agreements between banks and their customers is the section 4-103 principle that an 
28
 U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (“An item containing a forged drawer’s signature or forged 
indorsement is not properly payable.”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1 § 15-3; CLARK 
& CLARK, supra note 1, ¶ 12.02.
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agreement cannot disclaim the obligations of good faith and ordinary care, it is extremely 
hard to see why such an agreement would be not be enforceable.  After all, there is at 
least some theoretical basis, however weak it may be in modern practice, for a contention 
that a payor bank should be aware of its own customer’s signature.  By contrast, there is 
no way that a payor bank could determine whether the indorsement of a payee of its 
customer’s check was forged.
Thus, we see that far more is at stake in such cases as Jefferson Parish than the 
specific issue of responsibility for unauthorized facsimile signatures.  Rather, those cases 
pose the far more profound issue of whether the basic loss allocation scheme of the check 
system can be varied by agreement.  
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LOSS ALLOCATION IN THE CHECK SYSTEM
The outsider fraud version of the forged facsimile signature case situation thus 
raises basic questions about the fundamental principles of loss allocation for the check 
collection system.  Or, more precisely, the case raises the question of whether there are 
any fundamental principles.  In essence, the approach taken by Jefferson Parish amounts 
to saying that there are no fundamental principles of loss allocation.  Rather, the matter is 
entirely subject to whatever agreement the parties happened to have entered into.  If the 
payor bank happens to accept responsibility for unpreventable losses, so be it.  But, if the 
agreement provides that the customer bears the risk of unpreventable losses, that too is 
fine.  To be sure, the statutory provisions will come into play if there are grounds for an 
assertion that the loss could have been prevented if either the payor bank or the customer 
had been more careful.  Yet the starting place—who bears the risk in cases where the loss 
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was not preventable by anyone’s exercise of ordinary care—would be the product purely 
of agreement.  Let us consider, then, whether that is a plausible approach to the law of the 
check system, or of payment systems in general.
The question of loss allocation for the check system must take account of the fact 
that in the check system, unlike most other payment systems, the flow of information and 
the flow of funds move in opposite directions.  The information directing the funds 
transfer is contained on the check, but the check is delivered to the payee, rather than to 
the banks involved in the funds transfer.  Thus the check—qua funds transfer information 
device—moves from the originator of the funds transfer to the beneficiary of the funds 
transfer.29  The beneficiary of the funds transfer then initiates the bank collection process, 
by depositing the check with its own bank and beginning the process which will carry the 
check to the originator’s bank for payment.  In the useful terminology of the ill-fated 
Uniform New Payments Code, the check system deals with “draw orders” that “pull” 
bank credit to the beneficiary from the originator.30  By contrast, in the ordinary form of 
29
 For convenience the terms used in U.C.C. Article 4A are used herein as general terms 
for the participants in any funds transfer, regardless of the mechanism or statutory law 
governing the system.  The Article 4A terminology uses two terms—“funds transfer” and 
“payment order”—to describe the instructions.  “Funds transfer,” U.C.C. § 4A-104(a), is 
the generic term for the series of transactions that together constitute the intended transfer 
of bank credit.  “Payment order,” U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1), is an instruction given by one 
person, be it user of the system or one of the banks participating in the system, to the 
party with which it is in contact directing the recipient to process a part of the funds 
transfer.  Thus, a “funds transfer” typically consists of a series of “payment orders.”  See 
U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) & cmt. 1.   “Originator” is defined in U.C.C. § 4A-104(d) as “the 
sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer,” while “beneficiary” is defined in 
U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(2) as “the person to be paid by the beneficiary’s bank.”
30
 Uniform New Payments Code § 51 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3 1983).  The official comment 
to that section explains the distinction as follows:
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electronic funds transfer, the flow of information and the flow of funds move in the same 
direction—the originator gives an instruction to its own bank directing that payment be 
made to an account of the beneficiary at the beneficiary’s bank.  Using the UNPC 
terminology, an ordinary electronic funds transfer is a “pay order” that “pushes” bank 
credit from the originator to the beneficiary.
Subsections (1) and (2) define two key terms, “draw order” and 
“pay order.”  A “draw order,” such as a check, is initiated by the drawer 
and transmitted to the payee.  If the drawer is the payee or if the check is 
drawn payable to cash the transmittal is completed by the drawing of the 
check.  A draw order, such as a prearranged debit through an automated 
clearing house, may be initiated by the payee on behalf of the drawer and 
sent to an account institution.  Seller drafts drawn on buyers, if for 
acceptance by an account institution, direct the drawee to accept.  A “draw 
order” may be written, e.g. a check, or electronic, e.g. a prearranged debit 
through a clearing house.  All draw orders pull credits back to the person 
entitled to payment in a direction opposite to the one in which the order is 
transmitted.
A “pay order” goes from the drawer to the drawee directing the 
drawee to pay or effect payment to the payee.  A pay order always has a 
payee, although the payee may also be the drawer as on a home terminal 
or telephone instruction ordering a bank to transfer funds from a checking 
to a savings account.  If the drawee holds the account of the payee, the 
“pay order” asks the drawee to pay the payee; if the payee’s account is 
with another account institution, the drawee is asked to effect payment to 
the payee.  This may be done through another account institution, as by a 
telex to a correspondent, or through settling account institutions, as by a 
Fed Wire.  The order and the funds are from the drawee to the payee, and 
the order and funds move in the same direction.  Wire transfers, 
prearranged credits through an automated clearing house, telephone and 
home terminal transfers are all “pay orders’.  In addition, electronic point-
of-sale orders are regarded as pay orders.  The cardholder orders its issuer 
to pay the merchant on the transaction.  While the merchant may obtain a 
credit from its own bank based on a written receipt for the transaction or 
electronic notice of the transaction, “payment” must still be made by the 
issuer to the merchant’s bank for the transaction to be completed.
See also Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers And The Uniform New Payments Code, 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664, 1679-80 (1983).
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In a “draw order” funds transfer system such as the check system, an unauthorized 
funds transfer might be caused by intervention at either the originator’s end of the 
transaction or at the beneficiary’s end of the transaction.  In the originator fraud scenario, 
the fraudster forges the drawer’s signature on a check.  The fraudster might direct that 
payment be made to its own account, or to an account opened in the name of a fictitious 
person, but the essence of the fraud is that the fraudster initiated a transfer that was never 
authorized by the actual customer.  In the beneficiary fraud scenario, the fraudster takes 
check that was genuinely drawn by the drawer and diverts payment to the fraudster away 
from the intended beneficiary.  Translating the description of these two basic scenarios 
from functional terms into the conventional terminology of the check collection system, 
we can consider two simple check fraud scenarios:  forgery of the drawer's signature 
(originator fraud) and forgery of an indorsement (beneficiary fraud).  Let us consider the 
basic loss allocation approach that has been taken to these two scenarios, taking them up 
in opposite order.
In the forged indorsement scenario, Drawer draws a genuine check to the order of 
Payee on its account with Payor Bank and sends it to Payee.  Fraudster steals the check 
from Payee, forges Payee's indorsement, and deposits the check for collection at the bank 
at which Fraudster maintains an account, herein described as Depository Bank.31
Depository Bank forwards the check to Payor Bank which pays it.  Assuming no 
negligence, the loss rests with Depository Bank.  In the simplest remedial scenario, 
31
 Of course, if the funds transfer had not been diverted by Fraudster, the intended payee 
would also have initiated collection by depositing the check at its depository bank.  Thus, 
other than in cases where the fraudster happens to use the same bank as the intended 
payee, in the forged check scenario the fraudster causes the check to be collected by the 
wrong bank acting as depository bank.
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Payee, as owner of the check, brings a conversion action against Depository Bank.  Payee 
prevails under section 3-420 because Depository Bank has "obtain[ed] payment with 
respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive 
payment."  Fraudster was not a person entitled to enforce, because the instrument was 
payable to Payee, not Fraudster, and Fraudster's indorsement in the name of Payee is 
ineffective.  The result in this case might be explained on grounds familiar from 
negligence law on the basis that Depository Bank is perhaps in the best position to have 
prevented the loss by demanding better identification from Fraudster before cashing the 
check or opening the account for Fraudster.  In fact, however, it is doubtful that 
negligence concepts are the basis of the loss allocation rule.  The result in the forged 
indorsement case is entirely consistent with ordinary concepts of property and 
conversion.  Suppose that Fraudster had stolen a painting from Payee and sold it to 
Depository Bank.  Depository Bank would be liable to Payee in conversion because 
Depository bank dealt with the painting for a person not its true owner.  The liability of a 
person who takes stolen property from a thief is not in any sense based on negligence, but 
simply on the fact that the person has purchased property from a person not its true 
owner.
In the forged drawer's signature scenario, Fraudster steals a blank check from 
Drawer, and makes it payable to Payee, forging Drawer's signature.  Payee deposits the 
check for collection at Depository Bank.  Depository bank forwards the check to Payor 
Bank which pays it.  When Drawer discovers the loss, it complains to Payor Bank.  Payor 
Bank is required to recredit Drawer's account, because Payor Bank has charged the 
account for the amount of an item that was not genuinely drawn by its customer. 
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If Payor Bank seeks to pass the loss to Depository Bank, its cause of action would 
be an action for restitution of money paid by mistake.  Ordinarily a bank that has paid out 
money to a person not entitled to receive it would prevail in a restitution action, as in the 
common case of a bank's payment by mistake to person it erroneously believed was its 
customer, or overpayment to an actual customer.32  Yet Payor Bank will lose in an action 
against Depository Bank, or any prior party, under the rule derived from the venerable 
case of Price v. Neal.33  Under the rule of Price v. Neal, there is an exception to the usual 
principle that money paid by mistake can be recovered, so that a drawee that pays a check 
over the forged indorsement of the drawer cannot recover the money.  Thus, in the case 
of forgery of the drawer's signature, the loss rests with the Payor Bank.
The rationale for the rule of Price v. Neal has often been questioned.  At the time 
of the decision, in the late eighteenth century, the result might have been justified by 
ordinary negligence concepts.   The theory would be that the drawee, or payor bank,  is 
expected to know the signature of the drawer, and therefore placing the loss on the 
drawee is consistent with the notion that the drawee was in the best position to have 
prevented the loss.  As Lord Mansfield is reported to have said in the case itself, "it was 
incumbent upon the plaintiff [the drawee] to be satisfied 'that the bill drawn upon him 
was the drawer's hand,' before he accepted or paid it."34  That rationale was noted, 
although with some skepticism, in the Comments to former 3-418, "The traditional
32 E.g., Bank of Naperville v. Catalano, 408 N.E.2d 441 (1980).  See generally 3 GEORGE 
E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 14.8 (1978); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001)
33
 3 Burr. 1354,  97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1763).
34
  3 Burr. at 1357, 97 Eng. Rep. at 872.
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justification for the result is that the drawee is in a superior position to detect a forgery 
because he has the maker's signature and is expected to know and compare it."   Under 
modern conditions, however, that rationale is questionable, and has frequently been 
doubted.  Given the realities of modern high-volume check processing, it is quite unlikely 
that the payor bank will actually have any significant chance of detecting the forgery of 
its drawer's signature.   Indeed, the weakness of this rationale has long been noted.  Over 
a hundred years ago, James Barr Ames pointed out that "if the drawee's negligence were 
the test, he ought to be allowed to show, in a given case, that he was not negligent; for 
example, that the forgery was so skillfully executed as naturally to deceive him."35
Skepticism about any negligence rationale for the rule has been repeated again and again 
by writers on commercial law.36
The alternative rationale advanced in the comments to the original version of 
Article 3 was that "a less fictional rationalization is that it is highly desirable to end the 
transaction on an instrument when it is paid rather than reopen and upset a series of 
35
 James Barr Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 6 HARV. L. REV. 297, 298 (1891).  
Ames also correctly notes that the negligence of a person who pays money by mistake is 
not, in other circumstances, a defense to an action in restitution to recover money paid by 
mistake.  Id.  In a statement that says as much about changes in the profession's attitudes 
toward explanation of doctrine as it does about the issue itself, Ames concluded that "the 
true principle, it is submitted, upon which cases like Price v. Neal are to be supported, is 
that far-reaching principle of natural justice, that as between two persons having equal 
equities, one of whom must suffer, the legal title shall prevail."  Id. At 299. 
36 See, e.g., 4 HAWKLAND, supra note 1, § 3-418:2 ("This rationale …  does not withstand 
close scrutiny.  The drawee bank may not always be able to detect a forgery, even by use 
of reasonable care.  For instance, the forger may have obtained a facsimile of the drawer's 
signature, thereby making a perfect forgery."); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, 17-2 at 
614 (If Price v. Neal is founded on the theory that any drawee who fails to discover a 
forged drawer's signature is negligent and thus not entitled to recover payment, there 
should be an exception to that doctrine for those cases in which the signature is so 
cleverly forged that a banking employee using due care could not discover the forgery.")
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commercial transactions at a later date when the forgery is discovered."  That contention 
has fared no better with the commentators.  As White and Summers observe, there is no 
apparent basis for permitting transactions to be re-opened in forged indorsement cases yet 
precluding that result in cases of forgery of the drawer's signature.37
Not surprisingly, then, when a fresh look was taken at the law of the check 
system, at the time of the ill-fated proposed Uniform New Payments Code in the early 
1980s, the rule of Price v. Neal appeared to be headed for extinction.  Section 204 of the 
New Payments Code provided that "each customer, transmitting account institution or 
transferor of an unauthorized draw order is liable to all parties to whom the draw order is 
subsequently transmitted and who pay accept or give value in exchange for the order in 
good faith, if it has transmitted an unauthorized order …."38  The commentary 
announced, with near glee, that this section "marks the death knell for Lord Mansfield's 
famous opinion in Price v. Neal."39  As is well- known, the proposed Uniform New 
37 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1 §17-2 at 614.
38
 Uniform New Payments Code § 204(1) (P.E.B. Draft No. 3 1983).  The treatment of 
Price v. Neal in the New Payments Code is discussed at length in Steven B. Dow & Nan 
S. Ellis, The Proposed Uniform New Payments Code: Allocation of Losses Resulting from
Forged Drawers' Signatures, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 399 (1985).
39
 Uniform New Payments Code § 204(1) cmt. 2 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3 1983).  Inasmuch as 
drafts of the proposed Uniform New Payments Code are not widely available, it may be 
worth setting forth at length the comments on the rule of Price v. Neal:
Subsection (1), applicable to draw orders, marks the death knell for 
Lord Mansfield’s famous opinion in Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. 
Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), which held that no warranty of the genuineness of 
the drawer’s signature is given to the payor bank by a person transmitting 
a check for collection  This principle is preserved in Articles 3 and 4, by 
the limited warranties given to the payor or acceptor under U.C.C. 3-417 
(1) and 4-207 (1), and by the rule that payment is final in favor of a holder 
in due course or a person who has in good faith changed position in 
reliance on payment, U.C.C. 3-418. ….
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Payments Code encountered substantial objection—perhaps because, as its name 
suggests, it was a wholly new and unified treatment of the law of all payment systems—
The rationale for the rule is not convincing.  First, the traditional 
justification that the drawee is in a superior position to detect the forgery 
seems dubious today.  Given the computerized payment of checks, 
necessitated by the high volume of items submitted for payment, it is 
uneconomical for an account institution to check the validity of all 
signatures.  This is reflected by the reality that banks do not check 
signatures under a certain dollar amount even though they will be liable.  
It is cheaper to bear the liability than to avoid it.  Of course, signatures on 
checks over a certain dollar amount are scrutinized, and the dollar amount 
screen often depends on the type of account, e.g. corporate or consumer.
The second rationale for the rule is finality–the need for repose on 
transactions.  If there is a close decision on the superior position rationale, 
the argument is that the issue should be resolved by making the payor 
bank liable to avoid reopening the transaction.  See Comment 1 to U.C.C.
3-418.  It must be recognized, however, that there is no such repose in 
cases of forged endorsements where warranties are now given to the payor 
bank, see U.C.C. 3-417 (1) (a); 4-207(1) (a).  
Not only is the rationale for the rule questionable, but the rule can 
be thought of as not giving adequate incentives to payees to check on the 
bona fides of people drawing checks to them.  Under existing law, a 
merchant cashing a check need not be concerned with whether a person 
paying by check is actually the owner of the account on which the check is 
drawn.  If Price v. Neal is abolished such incentives would exist.  Check 
cashing outside the banking system is much less computerized thus 
allowing better opportunities for verifying the identity of a check casher.  
… Absent Price v. Neal, not only would the depositary bank be liable to 
the payor on a forged drawer’s check, but the depositor would be liable to 
the depositary.  If the depositor was not the payee, as on a third party 
check, loss would ultimately lie with the payee, the taker from the thief.  
Of course, the payee might be out of the picture, so the third and arguable 
innocent party would be at risk, but endorser insolvency or dishonesty is a 
risk generally run by endorsees on third party checks.  Account institutions 
should generally support abolishing Price v. Neal because risks now borne 
by them could be shifted to their customers.
In addition, application of Price v. Neal makes no sense in cases of 
check truncation, where the drawer’s signature is not available for 
inspection by the payor account institution – assuming technology could 
not capture the signature at a reasonable cost.  Since, on balance, the rule 
has no convincing justification and some significant costs in today’s high 
speed check processing environment, it is abolished.
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and the ambitious project was abandoned.40  The revision of Articles 3 and 4 that 
emerged from the more limited project that took the place of the proposed Uniform New 
Payments Code continues the rule of Price v. Neal.41  Perhaps the appetite of those 
participating in the revision for significant change had simply been worn down, or 
perhaps the banks that might be expected to seek a change to the rule preferred to fight 
other battles.42 In any event the rule of Price v. Neal is continued by the revision and the 
commentators appear to regard the rule as a product of history that is unjustifiable under 
modern conditions, but unlikely to change.43
40
 For a brief account of the history of the ill-fated New Payments Code project, and its 
transformation into the more limited project for addition of Article 4A on wholesale wire 
funds transfers and revision of Articles 3 and 4, see Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 
and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405 (1991).
41
 U.C.C. § 3-418(a) & (c).  The commentary abandons any effort at providing a policy 
rationale for the rule, noting merely that, "Subsections (a) and (c) are consistent with 
former Section 3-401 and the rule of Price v. Neal."  Id. cmt. 1.  See also U.C.C. § 3-417 
cmt. 3 ("subsection (a)(3) retains the rule of Price v. Neal … that the drawee takes the 
risk that the drawer's signature is unauthorized unless the person presenting the draft has 
knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized.")
42
 As one observer has noted:
To begin with, the revision does not change the basic rule of Price v. Neal.  
Although this rule has been much criticized, it does not create operational 
problems.  In fact, it is clearly the simplest rule from an operational 
perspective, because it requires that drawee banks simply absorb certain 
losses that they might otherwise pass on by litigation or negotiation under 
a negligence or a quasi-negligence regime.  Apparently, this operational 
simplicity is enough of an advantage so that banks have not been anxious 
to change Price v. Neal and escape additional liability.  The revision, as 
might be expected from its underlying policy, leaves the rule unchanged 
on the basis of these operational considerations.
Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the 
UCC, 43 BUS. LAW. 621 (1988).
43 See, e.g., Lary Lawrence, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 245 (1997) ("Why, 
you may ask, does the payor bank suffer the loss? I wish that I could give you some 
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Given the uniform and long-standing criticism of the rule of Price v. Neal, the 
surprising thing is that it has so long endured.  It is, of course, possible that this is simply 
an example of inertia.  But before abandoning any effort to justify the rule, it is worth 
giving the matter another thought.
The seeming anomaly of the rule in Price v. Neal emerges clearly from a diagram 
of the forged indorsement and forged drawer's signature scenarios.
Figure 1-1 Forged Indorsement
In the forged indorsement scenario, the loss rests with the person who took the instrument 
from the Fraudster, that is, the Depository Bank.  The result seems consistent with basic 
negligence concepts and sound policy, in that the Depository Bank is probably in the best 
position to have avoided the loss by exercising greater care before taking the instrument 
from the Fraudster.
logical explanation.  All of the proffered explanations appear to be more like 
rationalizations.")
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Figure 1-2  Forged Drawer Signature
In the forged drawer signature scenario, the loss rests with the Payor Bank, under the rule 
of Price v. Neal.  This seems rather peculiar since the Payor Bank did not, in any sense, 
dealt with the Fraudster.  Once one passes the unrealistic eighteenth century concept that 
it was somehow negligent for the Payor Bank to fail to detect the forgery, one is left with 
little reason for placing the loss with the Payor Bank rather than with the person who took 
the instrument from the Fraudster, who at least had some opportunity to prevent the loss 
by more careful dealing.
In considering whether the rule of Price v. Neal is in fact an anomaly, it is 
important to state the issue correctly.  The issue addressed by the rules on forged 
indorsements and the Price v. Neal rule is not who bears the loss if some party might be 
charged with negligence.  That question is addressed by other provisions of the Code 
ensuring that if there is a basis for a finding that someone’s negligence substantially 
contributed to the forgery, that person will bear the loss.  Rather, the question is who 
bears the loss in the absence of a particularized showing of negligence, or, more to the 
point, who bears the loss if there is no basis for concluding that anyone's negligence 
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contributed to the loss.  In other words, the issue is not who should bear the loss in most 
cases, but who should bear the loss in those cases where the loss was, as a practical 
matter, unpreventable.  Once the issue is correctly framed, it seems doubtful that 
negligence principles help much in resolving it.  To say that the loss should be borne by 
the person in the best position to have avoided it provides no guidance on the question of 
loss allocation where, by hypothesis, the loss was unavoidable.   
Moreover, one must avoid the fallacy of confusing descriptions of the role that 
actors play in a particular transaction with descriptions of the parties themselves.  There 
is no such thing as a "Payor Bank" or a "Depository Bank."  There are only banks.  In 
some transactions a given bank acts as payor of checks and in others the same bank acts 
as a depository.  The terms do not designate different actors or different categories of 
actors, but simply the role that the particular actor happens to have played in a particular 
transaction.   There is a far more significant description of the banks, whether payor or 
depository.  They are the providers of the check payment system.  Viewed as such, the 
basic diagrams of the forged indorsement and forged drawer signature scenarios may be 
recast as follows:
Figure 2-1 Forged Indorsement
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Figure 2-2  Forged Drawer Signature
Under the existing rules, the loss in the forged indorsement scenario is borne by 
the providers of the payment system.  As it happens, the particular participant that bears 
the loss is the one that offered the depository rather than the payor function, but from the 
standpoint of overall allocation of the costs of forgery losses, that is a minor point.  Under 
the existing rules—specifically under the rule of Price v. Neal—the loss in the forgery of 
the drawer's signature scenario is also that the providers of the payment system bear the 
risk of unavoidable losses.  In the forged drawer signature scenario, the particular bank 
that bears the loss is the payor bank rather than the depository bank.  Again, however, the 
question of which bank bears the loss is a secondary point.  The significant point is that 
the loss is borne by one of the providers of the payment system rather than by a user of 
the system.
Now, consider what would happen if the rule of Price v. Neal were reversed.  As 
usually imagined, that would mean, in the current drafting structure, changing the 
warranties given on presentment of an item from a warranty of "no knowledge" of 
forgery of the drawer's signature to a flat warranty that the drawer's signature was 
genuine.  Thus the Payor Bank could recover from the Depository Bank for breach of 
warranty.  In turn, the Depository Bank could recover from the Payee for breach of the 
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transfer warranty of the genuineness of the drawer's signature.  The result would be that 
the loss rests with the Payee.  From the standpoint of potential ability to prevent the loss, 
that seems to make sense.  However, once the question is properly framed as who bears 
the loss of unpreventable forgeries; the change makes much less sense.
It is worth remembering that in the real world there is no such thing as a "Drawer" 
or a "Payee."  There are only people who use the check system.44  Sometimes a user plays 
the role of drawer and sometimes the role of payee.  But, that is a matter of detail.  The 
important distinction is that one is either a user of the payment system or a provider of 
the payment system.  Making that simplification, we can recast our diagrams as follows:
Figure 3-1 
 
The combination of the rules of forged indorsements and forged drawers signatures 
produces a simple result.  By contrast, if the rule of Price v. Neal  were rejected, there 
44
 For present purposes, however, we can retain the notion that there is a class of persons 
properly identified as "Fraudsters."
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would be no uniform general principle.  Rather the outcome in the general class of 
unauthorized charge cases would be that whether the loss is borne by the payment system 
providers or the payment system users would depend on the quirk of where and how the 
fraudster intervened in the payment transaction.  If the fraudster intervened at the 
originator end, the risk of unpreventable losses would be borne by a user.  If the fraudster 
intervened at the beneficiary end, the risk of unpreventable losses would be borne by a 
provider.
Thus, correctly viewed, the rule of Price v. Neal is not at all anomalous.  Quite the 
contrary, the rule of Price v. Neal is entirely consistent with the rules on forged 
indorsements.  The anomalous situation is the one that would prevail if the rule of Price 
v. Neal were eliminated.  If such a change were made, the result would be that the 
burden of unpreventable losses is borne not by the providers of the payment system but 
by the users of the system.45
45
 The Price v. Neal principle has been changed in a relatively minor respect by the most 
recent revisions of Articles 3 and 4.  The change involves the recently-developed practice 
of consumers agreeing with utility companies and others to whom they make routine 
payments that the payee, rather than drawer, can create an item that will be collected 
through the check system for the amount of the consumer’s monthly bill.  As applied to 
such an item, the ordinary rule of Price v. Neal that would impose the loss from 
unauthorized items on the payor bank can well be considered inappropriate.  Instead, it 
seems appropriate to impose on the entity that created the item the burden of assuring 
itself that the customer has genuinely consented.  That change is effected by the 2002 
amendments to Articles 3 and 4.  The amendments define a “remotely-created consumer 
item” as “an item drawn on a consumer account, which is not created by the payor bank 
and does not bear a handwritten signature purporting to be the signature of the drawer.”  
U.C.C. § 3-103(16).  The revision then creates a warranty by the transferor or presenter 
that the item has been authorized by the consumer.  U.C.C. §§ 3-416(a)(6); 3-417(a)(4); 
4-207(a)(6); 4-208(a)(4).  The effect of the changes is that a user does bear the risk of 
loss, but the limitation of the change to remotely-created consumer items assures that that 
change applies only in cases where the user who will bear the risk of loss is the party that 
submitted the item for collection.  So limited, the change is essentially consistent with the 
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Thus, the rules on forged indorsements and the rules on forged drawers’ 
signatures together embody a very basic but important principle:  The burden of 
unpreventable losses should rest with the providers of the payment system rather than 
with the users of the payment system.
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LOSS ALLOCATION IN THE OTHER PAYMENT SYSTEMS
We may test our conclusions about the loss allocation principle for the check 
system by considering how the law of other payment systems treats two basic questions:
1.  Whether the risk of unpreventable losses is borne by the providers of the 
payment system or the users of the payment system, and 
2.  If the default rule places the risk of unpreventable losses on the providers of 
the payment system, whether an agreement shifting that loss to the users of the payment 
system would be enforceable.
A.  Bank Credit Cards 
Prior to 1970, there was no statutory law on the allocation of fraud losses from 
credit cards.  The case law had not reached any uniform approach to fraud loss allocation.  
The earliest cases involved identifying coins or other tokens issued by department stores 
to their customers for use in connection with credit purchases.  Several early cases dealt 
with the question of customer liability for unauthorized charges made by persons who 
had stolen the credit coins.  An early Pennsylvania case treated the credit coin as 
analogous to a negotiable instrument in bearer form, thereby concluding that the
basic principal that the providers of the payment system bear the risk of loss for 
unpreventable losses.
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customer was liable for unauthorized use.46  By contrast another case of about the same 
era concluded that the analogy to bearer negotiable instruments was inapt, concluding 
that the customer bore no responsibility for unauthorized charges.47  A somewhat later 
case, involving a gasoline company credit card, concluded that on the particular facts, the 
customer was liable for the charges made by a thief, but the court indicated in passing 
that “ordinarily [the customer] should not be held liable for the debt created by the use of 
it by a thief or one not authorized to obtain credit on it.”48
In these early cases, however, there appears to have been no agreement on the 
matter of unauthorized use, so the attitude of common law courts toward private 
agreements on loss allocation remained unclear.  Perhaps the best-known case of the pre-
statutory era on that issue was the 1960 Oregon decision in Union Oil Co. v. Lull.49  A car 
was stolen and the thief ran up charges on a gasoline company credit card that had been 
left in the car.  An agreement concerning the use of the card, printed on the back of the 
card itself, provided that:
The customer to whom this card is issued guarantees payment within 10 
days of receipt of statement, of price of products delivered to services 
rendered to anyone presenting this card, guarantee to continue until card is 
surrendered or written notice is received by the company that it is lost or 
stolen.50
46
 Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915).
47
 Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J. 658, 121 A. 131 (1923).
48
 Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147, 151(C.P. Lancaster County 1935).
49
 349 P.2d 243 (Ore. 1960).
50 Id. at 245
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The Oregon court rejected the cardholder’s contention that the cardholder’s liability for 
unauthorized use should be limited to cases “where, through his fault, the card was used 
by one not authorized to do so,” ruling that such a construction was clearly contrary to 
the agreement and “nothing in the transaction … would justify this modification of the 
conditions clearly expressed on the card.”51  The court, however, seized upon the use of 
the term “guaranty” as the device by which the agreement imposed fraud loss on the 
cardholder.  That unfortunate bit of draftsmanship enabled the court to draw upon the 
well-established principle that “promises of the uncompensated surety, guarantor or 
indemnitor are to be strictly construed, it sometimes being said that such promisors are 
favorites of the law.”52  Drawing on suretyship principles, the Court easily concluded that 
the cardholder’s liability for unauthorized use was conditioned upon the exercise of due 
care by the merchants accepting the card.  Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, 
the Court concluded that the card issuer bore the burden of proving that the merchants 
accepting the card made reasonable inquiry to determine whether the person presenting 
the card was its authorized user.  As one well-known commentator has observed, 
“[b]ecause such a burden of proof would be nearly impossible to sustain in many 
situations, the court seems to have bent over backwards to protect the consumer against 
such notice clauses.”53
51 Id. at 247.  One wonders how “clear” the terms could have been given that a rather 
lengthy legend was apparently printed on the back of the card itself.  The cardholder, 
however, had not at trial raised the issue whether the legend should be disregarded on 
contract of adhesion grounds, so the appellate court declined to consider that issue.  Id. at 
246-47.
52 Id. at 249.
53
 2 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 1 ¶ 15.03[1].
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The common law development of the law of cardholder liability for unauthorized 
use came to a halt with the enactment of federal legislation in 1970.54 The federal statute 
limits cardholders’ liability for “unauthorized use,” defined as a use of the card by a 
person “who does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from 
which the cardholder receives no benefit.”55  Under the federal statute, the cardholder is 
never liable an unauthorized use beyond the amount of $50, and then only if the 
cardholder accepted the card, the issuer gave adequate notice of potential liability, the 
issuer provided a means of notification in the event of loss or theft, the unauthorized use 
occurred before notice was given to the issuer, and the issuer provided a method for 
identification of the authorized user, such as a signature requirement.56
The provision on liability for unauthorized use of credit cards was added to the 
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act in 1970 by a rider attached to a statute on a 
different subject.57  For legislative history of the credit card measure, one must look to 
the hearings and report on the credit card bill as it had previously been adopted in the 
Senate.58
54
 P.L. 91-508, Tit. V, 84 Stat. 1114, 1126-27 (1970).
55
 Truth in Lending Act § 103(o),  15 U.S.C. § 1602(o).  Most of the caselaw deals with 
disputes about whether a use of the credit card by a relative or friend of the named 
cardholder was “authorized,” commonly in the setting of disputes among family members 
in connection with divorce or equivalent breakdown of non-marital relationships.  See 2 
CLARK & CLARK, supra note 1 ¶ 15.03[2][a] (2002).
56
 Truth in Lending Act § 133(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1).  
57
  P.L. 91-508, Tit. V, 84 Stat. 1114, 1126-27 (1970). 
58
  S. 721, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), S. REP. NO. 91-739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 
Unsolicited Credit Cards: Hearings on S. 721 Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as “Hearings on S. 721”]. 
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It is quite clear from the hearing and report that the principal issue of concern to 
the Congress was unsolicited mailings of credit cards.  Unsolicited mass mailing of credit 
cards was, in large measure, the way that the bank credit card industry was born and 
grew.  The practice, however, was considered to pose substantial problems in that it 
might encourage unwise overuse of credit by consumers, and in that it posed very 
significant problems arising out of theft of cards from the mail prior to their receipt by the 
intended addressee.  Section 132 of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act,59
prohibits unsolicited mailing of credit cards. 
The provision of § 133 limiting a card holder’s liability for unauthorized use of an 
accepted credit card seems to have been regarded more as a nice addition to the package 
of legislation on unsolicited credit cards than as a legislative response to a problem 
perceived to be serious.  Although there was much mention in the hearing of problems 
faced by consumers in rectifying billings for merchandise purchased by someone who 
stole an unsolicited card from the mail, there is little in the legislative history to suggest 
that there was a serious problem of credit card issuers actually attempting to collect from 
consumers for purchases actually made by an unauthorized user, either before or after 
notice of the loss or theft of the card.  Arthur Brimmer, a member of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, testified as follows:
In the case of the misuse of cards stolen or lost after being 
accepted by the cardholder it is generally true that the customer has no 
liability for fraud losses after the bank has been informed that the card is 
lost or stolen.  As for the liability of the cardholder prior to informing the 
bank, there is much more variation in banks’ policies.  Some banks seek to 
collect in these cases from the customer for all losses occurring before the 
bank was notified.  Others do not attempt to collect even where the 
59
  15 U.S.C. 1642, added by the 1970 Act.
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customer does not report the loss or theft of the card.  Still other banks 
(and some State statutes) specify an upper limit on the dollar liability of 
the customer.
As we understand the situation, the majority of banks follow the 
practice of absorbing losses, but do not reveal the policy to their customers 
for fear they might be unduly careless in their handling of the card.  This is 
often true even where the banks inform the customer that his liability if 
limited to, say, $50 or $100.  These announced limits are primarily 
designed to make the customer take care in the handling of the card and to 
stimulate prompt reporting of lost or stolen cards.  Actual policy, 
therefore, is often more lenient than announced policy.
We would like to see all banks inform their credit card customers 
of the potential liability.  This and the related aspects of customer liability 
are too important to leave to uncertainty on the part of the customer.  
Failure to disclose the terms of liability are not tolerable standards of 
business conduct for card issuers.60
No witness seems to have disagreed with the idea of the limitation on liability, nor 
to have suggested that it would actually change the practice of card issuers. 61  The only 
basis for the $50 liability seems to have been a desire to encourage prompt reporting of 
the loss or theft of cards by holding out the threat of $50 liability.  The only disagreement 
seems to have been on the question of whether the $50 limit was too low to put teeth into 
the threat.62
60
  Hearings on S. 721, at 19. 
61 See, e.g., Statement of Thomas L. Bailey, Chairman, Bank Card Committee of the 
American Bankers Ass’n., Hearings on S. 721, at 106; Statement of James E. Brown, 
Director of Interbank Card Ass’n., Hearings on S. 721, at 118; Statement of Edward J. 
McNeal, President of the American Retail Federation, Hearings on S. 721, at 124-25.
62
 Consider, in this regard, the following interchange between Senator Proxmire and 
Edward J. McNeal, President of the American Retail Federation:
Senator Proxmire:   Are you familiar with the laws of Massachusetts and 
Illinois with respect to cardholder liability? 
Mr. McNeal:   I understand there is some limitation on cardholder liability 
in those States.  I believe in the case of Massachusetts it is $100.  I am not 
familiar with ----
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Senator Proxmire:   $75 in Illinois.
Mr. McNeal:   $75 in Illinois.
Senator Proxmire:   To your knowledge, has there been any adverse effect 
on retailing as a result of these laws?
Mr. McNeal:   To the best of my knowledge, there has not been.
Senator Proxmire:   You do not have any compliments by the merchants 
that they have been inhibited by this? 
Mr. McNeal:   Not to my knowledge, sir, but we believe to make a ceiling 
unrealistically low invites fraud, which I think could create very serious 
problems.
Senator Proxmire:   What would you consider unrealistically low?
Mr. McNeal:   Well, we are concerned about the $50 limitation on your 
bill, sir, and naturally, the higher it was the better we believe it would be, 
because we believe that this would prevent the indiscriminate disregard by 
a customer who has an accepted credit card.  I think the consumer would 
guard his card more readily if he was aware that there was some liability if 
he did not take the necessary precautions.
Senator Proxmire:   So many people who have cards are likely to have 
three, four, or five.  It would seem to me he has a liability of $150 to $250 
if he lost his wallet or his cards.  He would certainly be in a position to 
have a strong incentive to notify the company.  
Mr. McNeal:   He would.  But in most cases, however, he has requested 
these cards and therefore he has some duty and responsibility to safeguard 
their well-being.  They are a convenience to him and naturally they are a 
convenience to the merchant or other person who has distributed them to 
him.
Senator Proxmire:   If you lost your checkbook and somebody forges your 
name or uses your check, you are not liable at all.
Mr. McNeal:   This is correct, and in the case of the overwhelming 
majority of retailers there is no liability on a person who takes the 
necessary precautions.
Senator Proxmire:   The point I make is, as credit cards replace checks, the 
consumer gradually loses his rights.  With a check he has a clear right, no 
liability; with a credit card he has unlimited liability now and even under 
the provision of my bill he would have a $50 liability, and you say he 
ought to have a bigger liability than that or your implication is that we 
should.
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Since the limitation on cardholders’ liability is contained in a federal statute, and 
since that statute makes no provision for expansion of cardholder liability, an agreement 
that purported to impose greater liability on the cardholder would obviously be 
unenforceable.  The statute does not even leave this to inference, but states explicitly that 
“[e]xcept as provided in this section, a cardholder incurs no liability from the 
unauthorized use of a credit card.”63  Indeed, one might well question whether a 
cardholder bears any liability for an unauthorized use.  The federal statute does not say 
that the cardholder is liable for the first $50; rather it says that the cardholder is not liable 
for any amount in excess of $50.  Moreover, the statute provides explicitly it does not 
impose any liability on the cardholder “in excess of his liability … under other applicable 
law or under any agreement with the card issuer.”64  As noted above, the case law prior to 
the enactment of the federal statute was far from clear on whether an agreement imposing 
liability on the cardholder for unauthorized use would be enforceable.  
B.  Consumer Electronic Funds Transfers
As consumer electronic funds transfer systems began to be implemented in the 
early 1970’s, there was considerable concern about whether there was an adequate body 
of laws governing the rights and obligations of the participants.  Some suggested that 
little, if anything, need be done, on the theory that Article 4 of the U.C.C. supplied the 
Mr. McNeal:   I must say I do not believe that the analogy to the check is 
exact or accurate today.  I believe there is a vast difference between a 
checking account today and a credit card
Hearings on S. 721, at 127.
63
 Truth in Lending Act § 133(d)  15 U.S.C. § 1643(d).  
64
 Truth in Lending Act § 133(c)  15 U.S.C. § 1643(c).  
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applicable law, or could be made to do so by a minor modification of the § 4-104 (1) (g) 
definition of “item.”65  Most observers, however, were less sanguine about the ease with 
which existing check law could be adapted to EFT systems.
Much of the concern began to center around the matter of the rights of consumer 
users of EFT systems against the financial institutions providing the systems.  In 1974, 
Congress established the National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers to 
investigate various issues concerning EFT and report thereon to the Congress.66   The 
Commission issued its final report in 1977.67   The Commission’s report dealt with a 
variety of issues beyond matters of payments system law, such as the impact of EFT on 
privacy rights, security of EFT systems, bank regulation issues, the impact of EFT on 
competition, anti-trust concerns, the impact of EFT on monetary policy and regulation, 
etc.  Our present concern is limited to issues of payments system law of the sort for which 
Articles 3 & 4 of the U.C.C. provide the governing law in the check system.  In this area, 
the Commission’s basic recommendation was that given the evolving state of EFT 
systems, “the appropriate approach to these new financial service concepts is, in general, 
to permit their further evolution in a relatively unconstrained way ….”68   On the other 
hand, the commission noted that existing law was in some instances inadequate and that 
new legislation was called for.  “[S]ome aspects of consumer concern are so fundamental 
that they should be addressed at this time in order to guarantee to consumers a number of 
65 See John J. Clarke, An Item Is an Item Is an Item: Article 4 of the U.C.C.  and the 
Electronic Age, 25 BUS. LAW. 109 (1969).
66
  Pub. L., No. 93-495, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2403-08). 
67 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1977) (hereinafter cited as NCEFT Report).  
68
  NCEFT Report at 6.
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basic rights in an EFT environment.”69  On the specific issue of liability for unauthorized 
use, the Commission recommended that “an EFT account holder should have no liability 
for an unauthorized use of his account unless the depository institution can prove, without 
benefit of inference or presumption, that the account holder’s negligence substantially 
contributed to the unauthorized use and that the depository institution exercised 
reasonable care to prevent the loss.”70
Congress did not wholly adopt the suggestions of the NCEFT.  Rather, it followed
a model somewhat closer to that used for credit cards, in which the careful consumer’s 
liability for unauthorized use would, in most cases, be limited to $50.  The legislative 
history suggests that no-one thought that the user should liable for unauthorized use, nor 
that the issue should be left entirely to private agreement; rather the issue was seen as a 
problem of devising a liability scheme that would include an adequate incentive to ensure 
careful customer behavior while not imposing the prospect of ruinous liability on the 
user.71 The liability scheme ultimately adopted by the federal legislation reflects these 
69 Id.
70 Id. at 58.  The Commission further recommended that negligence “should be limited to 
writing the PIN on the card, keeping the PIN with the card, or voluntarily permitting the 
account accessing devices, such as the PIN and the card, to come into the possession of a 
person who makes or causes to be make an unauthorized.”  Id.
71
 The federal EFT Act was ultimately enacted in the closing hours of the 95th Congress 
as one ornament on what had by then become a Christmas tree bill covering diverse 
banking law subjects.  Title XX of the Financial Institutions Regulating and Interest Rate 
Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat, 3641, 3278 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1693-93r as an amendment adding Title 1X to the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. §1601-92).  For the legislative history of the EFT Act, we must look primarily to 
the reports and hearings on its predecessor bills in the House and Senate.  For the views 
of the NCEFT, see Consumer Protection Aspects of EFT Systems, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978) (Statement of Herbert Wegner, Vice-Chairman 
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concerns by setting forth a somewhat complicated liability system, and by conferring 
authority on the Federal Reserve System to adopt regulations implementing the statute.72
As is the case with the federal law on credit cards, the starting place is the definition of an 
“unauthorized electronic funds transfer” as a transfer from a consumer’s account 
“initiated by a person other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the 
transfer and from which the consumer receives no benefit.”73  The statute then establishes 
a multi-tiered liability scheme.
Initially, the consumer bears no liability for unauthorized use unless the financial 
institution has satisfied three requirements.74  The access device must be an “accepted 
of the NCEFT).  For general views on the $50 liability limit, see H. REP. NO. 95-1315, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1978).
72
 Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act §§ 901-20, 15 U.S.C.  §§ 1693-1993r; Federal 
Reserve System Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1 – 205.16.  For convenience, citations 
herein are to the Regulation E provisions, without corresponding provisions of the statute 
itself.
73
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205(2)(m).
The EFT rules limit liability for use of an access device without “actual 
authority,” 12 C.F.R. § 205(m), while the credit card rules limit liability for use without 
“actual, implied, or apparent authority,” TILA § 103(o), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o).  The 
difference in wording poses difficulties in EFT cases where the consumer has done 
something that might constitute a conferral of implied or apparent authority upon another 
and then seeks to withdraw that authorization.  The EFT rules might be read to have no 
application to such a case, on the grounds that the use was not a use without “actual 
authority” and hence was not an “unauthorized” use.  Regulation E, however, goes on to 
provide that the term “unauthorized electronic funds transfer” does not include a use by a 
person to whom the consumer gave the access device “unless the consumer has notified 
the financial institution that transfers by that person are no longer authorized.”  12 C.F.R. 
§ 205(m)(1).  That provision might be read to imply that once the consumer gives notice 
any further use by the other person is an “unauthorized” use to which the liability limits 
apply.  On the other hand, the proviso on notice might be read as independent of the basic 
definition limiting unauthorized use to uses without actual authority.  The interpretive 
problem is discussed in 1 BAKER, BRANDEL, &. PANNABACKER, supra note 1
¶14.02[3][a] (2003).
74
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6.
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access device;”75 a limitation addressed to the problem, common in the early days of 
credit cards and consumer EFT, of the mailing of unsolicited cards to consumers.76   The 
financial institution must have provided a mechanism by which the authorized user of the 
device can be identified, such as a PIN or other identification method.77  The financial 
institution must have provided written disclosure to the consumer concerning 
unauthorized use liability and the means of notification of loss or theft of the device.78
The first tier liability limit establishes the basic principle that a consumer’s 
liability for an unauthorized electronic fund transfer is limited in amount to $50, provided 
that the consumer notified the financial institution of loss of theft of the access device 
within two business days after learning of the loss or theft.79  The second tier liability 
limit provides that a consumer who fails to give notice of loss of theft of the access 
device within two business days may be liable for loss up to $500.  The third tier liability 
rule provides that a consumer who fails to report an unauthorized transfer within sixty 
days after a periodic statement is sent showing the unauthorized transaction may be liable 
without limitation if the financial institution establishes that the loss could have been 
prevented had the consumer properly examined that statement and reported the 
unauthorized transfer.80
75
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. §§ 205(a)(1) & (2) & 205.6.
76 See 1 BAKER, BRANDEL, &. PANNABACKER, supra note 1 ¶ 14.01; 2 CLARK & CLARK, 
supra note 1 ¶ 15.02[2].
77
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
78
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
79
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(2).
80
 Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(3).  This provision is adapted from the rule, long a part of 
the law of the check system, that imposes liability upon a customer for sequential 
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As is the case with respect to credit cards, federal law leaves absolutely no room 
for expansion of cardholder liability by private contract.  Indeed, the provisions 
concerning the effect of private agreement on cardholder’s liability for unauthorized 
electronic funds transfers are copied directly from the federal legislation on credit cards.  
Thus, the statute provides that “[e]xcept as provided in this section, a consumer incurs no 
liability from an unauthorized electronic fund transfer.”81  Moreover, as is the case with 
the credit card legislation, the federal legislation on EFT provides that the customer’s 
liability may be reduced by other applicable law or agreement.82
C.  Wholesale Electronic Funds Transfers
Wholesale electronic funds transfers are governed by Article 4A of the U.C.C.83
Given the size of the typical business-to-business wire transfer, Article 4A establishes the 
forgeries if the customer fails to promptly examine statements and report forged checks.  
See U.C.C. § 4-406; 1 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 1 ¶ 10.05.
81
 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(e)
82
 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(d); Reg E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(6).
83
 To be more precise, Article 4A applies to any “funds transfer,” § 4A-102.  “Funds 
transfer” is defined by §4A-104(a) as “the series of transactions, beginning with the 
originator’s payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary 
of the order.”  “Payment order” is defined by § 4A-103(a)(1) as an instruction transmitted 
directly to a bank by the sender instructing that payment be made to a beneficiary.  The 
key element of the definition is that the instruction for payment be transmitted by the 
sender directly to the bank that is to make the payment.  Thus, Article 4A applies to 
credit transfers, that is, instructions given by the person making the payment to a bank.  It 
does not apply to transactions, such as check payments, in which the instruction goes 
from the person making the payment to the person to receive the payment, who in turn 
initiates collection through the banking system.  U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 4.  The 
application of Article 4A is in effect limited to business transactions by U.C.C. § 4A-108, 
which provides that Article 4A does not apply if any part of the funds transfer is 
governed by the federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq., which 
covers any electronic funds transfer from a bank account “established primarily for 
personal family, or household purposes” 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2).
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most economically significant set of legal rules on fraudulent payment transactions.  
Indeed, it has been estimated that wire transfers governed by Article 4A account for at 
least 85% of the dollar value of all payment transactions in the U.S. economy.84
The allocation of responsibility for fraudulent orders is governed by a rather 
complex set of rules set out in sections 4A-201 through 4A-203.85  The statutory pattern 
begins with the rule in section 4A-202(a) that a payment order “is the authorized order of 
the person identified as sender if that person authorized the order or is otherwise bound 
by it under the law of agency.”  Assuming that the receiving bank has accepted the order, 
the sender becomes obligated to pay the amount of the order to the receiving bank.86
Standing alone, this rule would impose liability on the customer only if the payment 
order was in fact authorized by the customer, or some principle of agency law precluded 
the customer from denying authorization.  The customer would incur no liability if the 
transaction was not authorized or the customer was not otherwise bound under the law of 
agency.
The actual authorization rule of section 4A-202(a) is, however, supplemented by 
the rule on “verified” payment orders set out in section 4A-202(b).  If the receiving bank 
Although the common application of Article 4A is to wholesale funds transfer 
initiated by electronic means, the Article actually applies to any business credit transfer, 
regardless of the means of communication used.  
84 ROBERT L JORDAN, WILLIAM D. WARREN AND STEVEN D. WALT, NEGOTIABLE 
INSTRUMENTS, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 237 (5th ed. 2000), citing Finance:  Trick or 
Treat?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1999, at 91.
85 See generally, Paul S. Turner, The UCC Drafting Process and Six Questions About 
Article 4A:  Is There a Need for Revisions to the Uniform Funds Transfer Law?, 28 
LOYOLA L. A. L. REV. 351 (1994); J. Kevin French, Article 4A’s Treatment of Fraudulent 
Payment Orders—The Customer’s Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 773 (1991); 
86
 U.C.C. § 4A-402(b) & (c).
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and the customer have agreed that the authenticity of payment orders is to be verified by 
a security procedure, the security procedure is commercially reasonable, and the bank 
accepted the order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure, then the 
receiving bank can treat the order as the effective order of the customer, even though it 
was not authorized nor was the customer otherwise precluded from denying authenticity 
under the law of agency.  The content of the test of “commercial reasonableness” of a
security procedure is somewhat further explicated by section 4A-202(c), which provides 
that the question of commercial reasonableness is to be determined by the court, rather 
than jury, based on such factors as the wishes and circumstances of the customer and 
practices of similarly situated customers and banks.87
The rules of subsections (a) and (b) of section 4A-202 on authorized and verified 
payment orders are subject to an important qualification by section 4A-203.  That rule 
87
 The statute also provides that any security procedure is deemed to be commercially 
reasonable if the bank offered another procedure that was commercially reasonable, but 
the customer declined to use that procedure and expressly agreed in writing that it would 
be bound by any orders accepted by the bank in compliance with the procedure chosen by 
the customer.  U.C.C. § 4A-202(c).
In a sense, the special rule of section 4A-202(b) on commercially reasonable 
security systems can be thought of as an adaptation of general agency principles to the 
special circumstances of the wire funds transfer business.  Suppose that the statute 
contained no special rules on commercially reasonable security procedures, stating only 
the basic rule set out in section 4A-202(a) that an order can be treated as the authorized 
order of the customer if it is in fact authorized or the customer is precluded from denying 
authority under the law of agency.  Suppose further that the bank and customer had in 
fact agreed upon a security system for testing payment orders and that a particular order, 
though not in fact actually authorized, passed muster under the security procedure 
adopted by the bank and customer.  If the customer denied authority, a fact issue would 
arise under the law of agency or related law, concerning whether the customer should be 
precluded from denying authenticity having agreed to the use of a reasonable security 
procedure.  The special rule of section 4A-202(b) places that inquiry and analysis or a 
surer footing, by establishing a special rule adapted to the circumstances of the funds 
transfer business, but the rule is not, in basic approach, very different from the approach 
that might have been developed by the courts under the general law of agency.
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deals with payment order that are not “authorized” but can be treated as “effective” under 
the special rule of section 4A-202(b) on orders verified pursuant to a commercially 
reasonable security procedure.  Under section 4A-203, the receiving bank is not entitled 
to charge the amount of an unauthorized payment order to the customer, even though the 
order passed muster under a commercially reasonable security procedure, if the customer 
is able to prove that the order was not caused by any person who either was entrusted by 
the customer with responsibility concerning payment orders or obtained from the 
customer either access to transmitting facilities or information facilitating a breach of the 
security system.  The principle of section 4A-203 can be seen as a specific instance of the 
general point discussed above that the rules on allocation of loss from unauthorized 
payments need to distinguish between internal and external perpetrators of the fraud.  
Under section 4A-203, if the customer proves that the unauthorized payment order did 
not originate from anyone internal to the customer’s organization, or anyone who 
obtained information essential to commission of the fraud from someone internal to the 
customer’s organization, then the loss will be borne by the bank.  If the customer is 
unable to make such a showing, then the loss will be borne by the customer.
Read together, the Article 4A rules establish both a substantive rule and a set of 
rules on the allocation of the burden of persuasion.  Viewed solely as substantive rules, 
that is, assuming that all the relevant facts are known and proven, the principle is fairly 
simple:  the bank bears the loss from external fraud; the customer bears the loss from 
internal fraud.  The complexity is primarily a matter of allocation of the burden of proof.  
If the order was verified by a commercially reasonable security system, then the burden is 
on the customer to prove that the loss was not caused by anyone internal to the 
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customer’s organization or anyone who obtained essential information from someone 
internal to the customer’s organization.  If the customer cannot make such a showing, 
then the customer bears the loss from an unauthorized but verified payment order. 
One of the most striking things about the Article 4A rules on allocation of loss 
from unauthorized payments is the approach taken to the possibility of variation by 
agreement.  By virtue of the scope provisions, Article 4A is effectively limited in 
application to transactions between banks and business entities.   Under section 4A-108,
the Article 4A rules do not apply to any funds transfer any part of which is subject to the 
federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act,88 which covers any electronic funds transfer from 
a bank account “established primarily for personal family, or household purposes.”89
Moreover, the typical transaction to which Article 4A applies is not one between a bank 
and a small business enterprise that might be regarded as occupying the borderline 
between the sphere of commercial affairs and consumer affairs. Rather, Article 4A deals 
with transactions between large commercial entitles.  In such situations, the typical 
approach taken by the commercial law is to defer almost entirely to freedom on contract.  
Under the basic rule of UCC section 1-102(3), the effect of provisions of the Code may 
be varied by agreement of the parties, subject to the limitation that an agreement may not 
disclaim responsibilities of good faith, diligence, and reasonableness.  On its face, Article 
4A appears to adopt a similar approach.
Section 4A-501 reads much like other provisions of the Code permitting variation 
by agreement.  It provides that “except as otherwise provided in this Article, the rights 
88
 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.
89
 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2).
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and obligations of a party to a funds transfer may be varied by agreement of the affected 
party.”  The catalog of specific provisions that preclude variation by agreement is, 
however, rather extensive.  
For present purposes, the most important non-variability rule is that set out in 
subsection (f) of section 4A-202, which provides that the liability system set out in 
sections 4A-202 and 4A-203 cannot be varied by agreement.  Thus, the basic loss 
allocation rules for unauthorized payment orders—including the rule of section 4A-203 
that the bank is liable for an unauthorized order if the customer is able to prove that it was 
a case of external fraud—is not subject to variation by agreement.   The list of non-
variable rules is, however, considerably more extensive.
Section 4A-305 provides that if a funds transfer is not completed in a timely 
fashion, the receiving bank that caused the failure is liable for the loss of the time-value 
of the money.  Significantly, the bank is not otherwise liable for consequential 
damages—the issue involved in the well-known Evra Bank case.90  Though the main 
effect of this rule is to exclude consequential damages liability, the remaining liability of 
90 Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).  In the Evra Bank case 
itself, the Seventh Circuit ruled that consequential damages could not be recovered for 
failure to complete a funds transfer in a timely fashion.  The basis of the Court’s decision, 
however, was that under the venerable case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), consequential damages could not be recovered in the absence of a 
showing that the defendant was aware of the special circumstances that might give rise to 
those damages.  That approach would leave the banks involved in wholesale funds 
transfers exposed to the possibility of extensive consequential damages liability in any 
case in which there was a basis for concluding that the bank had notice of the special 
circumstances.  See U.C.C. §4A-305 cmt. 2.
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the bank—for the loss of the time-value of the use of the money—cannot be varied by 
agreement.91
Section 4A-402 establishes the “money-back guaranty” rule, under which the 
obligation of the originator to pay its own bank is excused if the finds transfer is not 
completed the beneficiary’s bank.  In the absence of this statutory rule, one can well 
imagine that agreements between originators and their banks would provide that the
originator’s bank bears no responsibility for the failure on some other bank to complete 
the transaction.  Under the “money-back guaranty” rule, however, the originator is 
excused from any liability to pay its own bank if the transaction is not properly 
completed, even though that might be the result of some other bank’s failure.  Under 
section 4A-402(f), this rule cannot be varied by agreement.
Section 4A-404 provides that once the beneficiary’s bank has accepted a payment 
order, the bank is obligated to make payment to the beneficiary, and may face liability for 
consequential damages for failure to do so, if the bank had notice of the circumstances 
giving rise to the potential consequential damage claim.  Under section 4A-404(c) this 
liability of the beneficiary’s bank cannot be varied or disclaimed by agreement.
Section 4A-405 describes the mechanism by which a beneficiary’s bank makes 
payment of an order to the beneficiary, the usual mechanism being by credit to an 
account of the beneficiary and notice of that credit to the beneficiary.  Absent some 
special rule, it would not be surprising to find that banks routinely placed conditions on a 
beneficiary’s right to receive payment or made the credit provisional or otherwise subject 
91
 U.C.C. § 4A-305(f).
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to revocation.  Under section 4A-405(c), however, any such condition or provisional 
credit agreement is generally unenforceable.92
Section 4A-406 provides that the originator’s underlying obligation to the 
beneficiary is discharged at the time that the beneficiary’s bank accepts a payment order 
for the benefit of the beneficiary.  Subsection (d) of section 4A-406 provides that these 
rights of the beneficiary can be varied only by agreement between the beneficiary and the 
originator; that is, an agreement between either of the partiers and any of the banks 
involved in the funds transfer process would be unenforceable.
Thus, the statement in section 4A-501(a) that “except as otherwise provided in 
this Article” the rights and obligations of the parties to a funds transfer may be varied by 
agreement reminds one a bit of the old quip “Well other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was 
the play?”  Section 4A-501(a) purports to state the usual rule permitting variation by 
agreement, but the list of exceptions covers essentially all of the basic liability rules of 
Article 4A.  How is one to account for this radically anti-agreement stance in a part of the 
commercial code that is singularly designed to cover primarily transactions between 
sophisticated parties?
There has been considerable discussion and debate in recent years about the 
drafting process for revisions and new articles of the Uniform Commercial Code.  A 
principal theme in that debate has been whether the process is adequate to the task of 
92
 Subsections (d) and (e) of section 4A-405 establish limited exceptions to the rule that 
agreements cannot make credits provisional, covering certain payment through automated 
clearing houses and “doomsday” scenario rules of systems such as CHIPS that provide 
for multilateral netting and establish loss-sharing rules.  See U.C.C. § 4A-405 cmts. 3 & 
4; Norman R. Nelson, Settlement Obligations and Bank Insolvency, 45 BUS. LAW. 1473 
(1990)
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assuring balanced input from all affected groups.93  I have no wish to enter into that 
debate here.  Rather, the only point of present significance is that the drafting process for 
Article 4A was singularly well-suited to the objective of achieving a balance of input 
from providers of the wholesale wire transfer system and users of the system.  The fact 
that transactions involving consumers were excluded from the coverage of Article 4A 
meant that the difficult issue of assuring adequate representation of consumer interests 
was not presented in the Article 4A project.  Moreover, the fact that the transactions 
covered by Article 4A tend to involve large amounts of money, and tend to involve major 
non-financial firms as users, meant that the users of the system had sufficient economic 
incentive to participate in the drafting process.  The list of Advisors and Additional 
Participants for the Article 4A project includes not only a representative of the 
organization representing large users—the National Corporate Cash Management 
Association—but also representatives of such major individual users as Exxon, General 
Motors, Sears Roebuck, and Shell Oil.94  The official comments to section 4A-102 state 
quite explicitly that the drafting process for the Article 4A was a process of balanced 
negotiation between providers and users of the system: 
93
 A catalog of articles on the Code revision process is provided in Fred H. Miller, 
Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws—Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 
S. TEX. L. REV. 707, 708-09 n. 5 (1998).
94
 2B Pt II Uniform Laws Annotated 6.  See generally Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a 
Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist:  Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 
and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 762-65 (1993)(describing role of providers and users in 
the Article 4A drafting process).  The fact of extensive participation by representatives of 
providers and uses is undisputed, though Prof. Rubin’s assessment of the role of industry 
representatives has been sharply disputed. See Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for 
the Public Interest?  Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and 
Shadows) of Professors Rubin’s Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1994)
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Funds transfers involve competing interests—those of the banks 
that provide funds transfer services and the commercial and financial 
organizations that use the services, as well as the public interest. These 
competing interests were represented in the drafting process and they were 
thoroughly considered. The rules that emerged represent a careful and 
delicate balancing of those interests and are intended to be the exclusive 
means of determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected 
parties in any situation covered by particular provisions of the Article. 
Consequently, resort to principles of law or equity outside of Article 4A is 
not appropriate to create rights, duties and liabilities inconsistent with 
those stated in this Article.
Professor Warren, one of the two Reporters for the project, has described the 
participation of the affected groups in the drafting process:
This process worked at its best in the deliberations on Article 4A.  
At first, the differences among the three principal players—the Fed, 
CHIPS and the large corporate users—seemed intractable.  … Initially, 
these three groups seemed to enjoy bashing each other at our meetings.  
But over the years, owing in no small measure to the intelligence, 
judgment and firmness of Robert Jordan, who drafted Article 4A, 
differences were narrowed and a reasonable degree of consensus was 
achieved. A leading financial services lawyer and veteran of many 
legislative projects noted that never before had so many people 
knowledgeable about the legal and operational problems of wholesale wire 
transfers spent so much time together going over legislative proposals in 
such exhausting detail.  He likened it to peeling the layers of an onion.  In 
the end it worked.95
The issue of allocation of responsibility for fraudulent payment orders was one of 
the matters that prompted extensive debate and negotiation between providers of the 
payment system and users, with the parties beginning, as one might well expect, with the 
position that the other side should bear the responsibility.  Ultimately a compromise 
position emerged, the basic elements of which were (1) the users agreed that providers 
would not bear consequential damage liability for failure to complete a transfer, thereby 
95
 William D Warren, UCC Drafting:  Method and Message, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 811, 
815 (1993).
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eliminated the potential of  liability under the rule of the Evra Bank case, (2) the 
providers agreed to the “money back guarantee” provision ensuring that an originator 
would be absolved of responsibility to its own bank if the transfer was not completed, and 
(3) the providers agreed to the package of rules on unauthorized transfers ultimately 
included in sections 4A-201 – 4A-203, including the rule that the bank bears the 
responsibility for an unauthorized transfer which the user proves to have been the result 
of external fraud.96
Although the official comments do not explain the basis for the extensive series of 
provisions prohibiting variation by agreement, the attitude toward variation by agreement 
is easily understood in light of the drafting process for Article 4A.  On the key 
controversial issues of consequential damages, money-back guaranty, and liability for 
unauthorized transfers, the drafting process was itself a process of negotiation and 
compromise between providers and users.97  Moreover, the human beings involved in that 
negotiated compromise were the people from their respective organizations who had the 
96 See Carl Felsenfeld, Strange Bedfellows for Electronic Funds Transfers:  Proposed 
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 42 ALA. L. 
REV. 723, 746-50 (1991); Carl Felsenfeld, But the Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial 
Code Was Adopted, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 597, 605 (1993); Rubin, supra note 94, at 763-
65.
97
 On the Article 4A drafting process, see Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Process—
Consensus and Balance, 28 LOYOLA L. A. L. REV. 287 (1994).  The specific resolution of 
the much disputed isue of liability for unauthorized funds transfers was the result of a 
last minute suggestion by Donald Rapson, see Turner, supra note 85; a fact that Mr. 
Rapson has confirmed in private correspondence with the author.  There is, of course, 
room for doubt about whether the precise resolution of that point should be taken to 
represent a carefully thought-out position, or merely the product of the inevitable quirks 
of the drafting process.  For present purposes it suffices that the compromise position—
including the important substantive principal that the providers of funds transfer services 
bear the liability for unpreventable outsider fraud—was a position that could command 
agreement from all affected parties.
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greatest degree of expertise in the details of the wire transfer business and had spent 
extensive time and effort thinking through the problems of the business and plausible 
arrangements between users and providers.  By contrast, the human beings involved in 
setting up a particular wire transfer arrangement are unlikely to have either the time or 
experience to write or review documentation and assess the impact of particular choices 
about liability rules.  Thus, on the fundamental principles involved in the negotiated 
compromise that produced Article 4A, it is hard to see that any advantage could be 
produced by individual negotiation.  In short, the process of negotiation that is assumed 
to be the basis for rules in the U.C.C. permitting widespread variation by agreement had 
already taken place.  The drafting process was the negotiation.  Little could be gained, 
and much could be lost, by allowing the resolution of those points to be re- opened every 
time a funds transfer agreement is entered into.
D. Summary—Other Payment Systems.
Thus, we see for payment systems other than the check system, the law has quite 
uniformly recognized two basic principles:  (1) That the risk of loss from unpreventable 
forgeries is borne by the providers of the payment system rather than by the users; and (2) 
that no agreement between a provider and a user will be enforceable if it seeks to place 
on the user the risk of loss from unpreventable.  Thus, if the approach of the Jefferson 
Park case is followed we would have the anomalous situation that only the check 
system—the payment system that has been the subject of the longest development in 
caselaw and statute—would be governed by a regime of complete freedom of contract.
IV.  SIGNED VERSUS AUTHORIZED
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How, then, are we to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent propositions:  that an 
agreement between a payor bank and its customer cannot be given effect to the extent 
that it reverses the basic principle that a payor bank cannot charge a customer’s account 
for an item which was not authorized by the customer; and that a facsimile signature 
agreement is, in general, effective to resolve the question whether a facsimile signature is 
to be treated as genuine.  The answer may lie in a distinction, which may be insignificant 
with respect to manual signatures but significant with respect to facsimile signatures, 
between 
(1) the question whether the signature on a check is genuine, or is to 
be treated as genuine; and
(2) the question whether the check is authorized, or is to be treated as 
authorized.
With respect to manually signed checks, the question whether the signature of the 
drawer is genuine and the question whether the item is authorized are essentially 
identical.  If the signature is genuine, then the check is authorized.  Conversely, if the 
signature is not genuine, then the check is not authorized.  Suppose, for example, that 
Principal has a broken hand and cannot write.  Principal authorizes agent to sign an item 
in the name of Principal.  We decide whether check is authorized by deciding whether the 
mark is or is not to be treated as the signature of Principal.  The question whether the 
mark is to be treated as the signature of Principal is resolved by deciding whether the 
Agent was or was not authorized to place Principal's signature on the item.
The fact that in the ordinary case of manually signed checks the questions of 
signature genuineness and authority are identical does not mean that those questions are 
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identical with respect to other cases.  Suppose, for example, that in lieu of the facsimile 
signature device, the practice had developed of permitting unsigned checks.  That is 
really not all that far-fetched.  Exactly the same practice has developed with respect to 
credit cards.  At one time, no merchant would accept a credit card payment without 
obtaining the signature of the user.  Today, unsigned credit card use is common, for 
example in telephone sales and in sales from unmanned devices such as gasoline pumps.  
There would be no conceptual difficulty, however, in distinguishing authorized from 
unauthorized use of credit cards in unsigned transactions.  If a thief steals a credit card 
and uses it to purchase goods over the telephone or at an unmanned gasoline pump, it can 
easily be concluded that the use was unauthorized despite the fact that the presence or 
absence of a signature would play no role in that determination.98
Similarly, in consumer electronic funds transfer transactions, there is no difficulty
in distinguishing between authorized and unauthorized electronic funds transfers despite 
the absence of a signature device.  A nice illustration of the point is provided by a clever 
EFT fraud discovered in late 2002 in the Boston area.  The malefactors attached a small 
electronic device to the front of ATM machines over the spot where the card was 
ordinarily inserted.  An official-looking notice was attached to the machines informing 
users of a change and instructing them to insert their cards. The device read and recorded 
the account number and PIN but reported that a malfunction prevented the cash from 
98
 As it happens, the liability rules for credit cards are such that the issue would not arise 
in litigation.  Under the federal statute governing cardholder liability, an issuer cannot 
charge a cardholder for a use of the card unless, among other things, “the card issuer has 
provided a method whereby the user of such card can be identified as the person 
authorized to use it.”  15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(F).  
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being dispensed.  After a few hours, the malefactors returned to the ATM machine and 
removed the device, having thereby trapped the information needed to use the card.99
If the malefactors used the information obtained by the scheme to withdraw funds 
from a cardholder’s account, there would be no difficulty in the analysis of whether the 
withdrawal was authorized or not. Under the Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, a 
consumer's liability for unauthorized electronic funds transfers is limited to $50, with a 
higher maximum if the consumer fails to promptly report the theft of a card.  The 
question whether the withdrawal was authorized or not is a simple factual issue.  Under 
the act, an "unauthorized electronic funds transfer" is a transfer initiated by a person 
"without actual authority" unless the transfer was initiated by a person "who was 
furnished with the card, code, or other means of access to such consumer's account by 
such consumer."100  The question whether the withdrawal was authorized is not at all 
resolved by asking merely whether the correct PIN was used.  Indeed, the fact that the 
correct PIN was used tells the bank nothing about whether a particular use of the card 
was authorized.  The fact that the correct PIN was used is entirely consistent with many 
possibilities, including  (1) an actual authorized use of the card and PIN by the 
cardholder, or (2) a use of the card and PIN by someone other than the customer who had 
been given actual authority by the customer to make the withdrawal, or (3) a use of the 
card and PIN by someone who had not been authorized by the customer, but whose use 
of the card was facilitated by the customer's carelessness in, for example, writing the PIN 
on the card, or (4) an entirely unauthorized use of the card and PIN by someone, such as 
99 2 Arrested In Alleged ATM Card Scam, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2002, at B6.
100
 Electronic Funds Transfer Act §903(11), 15 U.S.C. §1693a(11).
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the malefactors in the clever scheme, who had obtained the account number and PIN by 
nefarious means for which the customer bears no responsibility, or even (5) an 
unauthorized use of the card and PIN by an employee of the bank who misuses 
information obtained in the ordinary course of employment.  We have no difficulty 
seeing that there is a difference between two issues:   whether the transaction was in fact 
authorized by the customer and, whether the bank had any means of telling whether the 
transaction was in fact authorized by the customer. The fact that the correct PIN was used 
does not completely resolve the question whether the transfer was in fact authorized.  
Rather, that is a question to be determined under agency law and related principles.
In the EFT setting, then, the relationship between the question whether the PIN 
was used and whether the transfer was authorized is more complex than the simple notion 
that authorization turns solely on the use of the PIN.  It is, of course, the case, that if a 
transaction is effected without use of the PIN, then that use would not be an authorized 
use for which the customer can be charged.  For example, if a malefactor discovered a 
way to make ATM withdrawals from accounts without any use of the card or PIN, the 
withdrawals would obviously be unauthorized and the bank could not charge them to the
customer’s account.  But, the fact that the correct PIN was used does not, without more, 
determine that the transfer was authorized.  In the case of the clever EFT fraud described 
above, the correct PIN would have been used, but that fact does not demonstrate that the 
withdrawals were authorized.  Rather, the question of authority turns on whether the 
customer in fact authorized the use of the PIN.  In ordinary cases, that will turn on the 
customer’s care and conduct in safeguarding the PIN. As the clever EFT fraud case 
illustrates, however, it is entirely possible that the correct PIN was used, but that the 
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malefactor obtained the PIN by a means entirely beyond the responsibility of the 
customer.  In that case, there would be no difficulty concluding that the use was not 
authorized.
The facsimile signature on checks issued pursuant to a facsimile signature
arrangement might be treated in essentially the same fashion as the PIN in a consumer 
electronic funds transfer.  The absence of any signature would, of course, demonstrate 
that the check was unauthorized, just as a withdrawal from an ATM machine made 
without the use of the PIN would be an unauthorized transfer.  That, however, is a point 
of relatively little significance.  The more important point is what consequences flow 
from the fact that a check does bear a facsimile signature, or a signature that resembles 
the facsimile signature on file with the bank.  Under the common form of facsimile 
signature resolution, the fact that the check bears a facsimile signature, or a signature that 
resembles the facsimile signature, settles, without more, the question of the bank’s 
authority to charge the amount of the check to the customer’s account.  By contrast, in the 
case of an electronic funds transfer, the fact that the correct PIN was used does not 
foreclose the customer from showing that the withdrawal was not in fact authorized.   If 
facsimile signatures were treated in the same fashion as the PIN in electronic funds 
transfers, the fact that a check bears the correct facsimile signature, or one which 
resembles the correct facsimile signature, would not end the inquiry into authorization.  
Rather, it would remain open to the customer to show that the particular check was not 
authorized by the customer, nor did the facts warrant any preclusion of the customer from 
asserting the lack of authority.  In short, rather than treating the presence or absence of a 
facsimile signature as the same question as that of authorization, these two questions 
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would be treated as distinct inquiries, as is the case in other forms of payment 
transactions.  While that approach may provide a possible solution to the problem of 
external fraud in facsimile signature cases, we need to consider in more detail precisely 
how a court confronted with an allegation of an unauthorized facsimile signature should 
treat the common form of facsimile signature resolution, which appears to place the risk 
of loss on the customer, regardless of how the authorized facsimile signature came to be 
placed on the check.
V.  ENFORCEABILITY OF FACSIMILE SIGNATURE RESOLUTIONS
We have previously considered whether the explicit statutory limits on variation 
by agreement would impose significant restraints on the enforceability of a facsimile 
signature resolution that imposes on the customer the risk of loss for any check that 
appears to bear a facsimile signature.  As we have seen, the only explicit limitation on 
variation of the statutory rules by private agreement is the section 4-103(a) rule that an 
agreement cannot “disclaim a bank’s responsibility for its own lack of good faith or 
failure to exercise ordinary care.”  As we have also seen, the unresolved issue in 
application of the rule is the content of the principal that good faith requires observance 
of “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”101  Specifically, the question is 
whether an agreement would be enforceable if it imposes on the customer the risk of loss 
for essentially unpreventable fraud, notwithstanding the basic principle of all payment 
systems that the providers, not the users, bear the risk of unpreventable loss.
101
 See TAN 23-24.
64
The question whether section 4-103(a) or related principles would permit 
agreements that vary fundamental rules of the check collection system has been discussed 
in the literature most extensively in connection with the Article 4 provisions on stop 
payment orders.  Section 4-403 provides that a customer may stop payment of a check, 
provided that the stop payment order is delivered to the payor bank at a time and manner 
that permits that bank to act upon it.  The text of the statute contains no explicit provision 
dealing with the question whether the stop-payment right may be restricted or eliminated 
by agreement.  If the question were governed solely by the rule of section 4-103(a), then 
it would seem that a bank could, by agreement, eliminate the customer’s right to stop 
payment, or, at least, absolve the bank of liability for a payment over a stop payment 
order in the absence of negligence by the bank.  Yet the comments to section 4-403 
indicate that the stop-payment right is more fundamental:  “The position taken by this 
section is that stopping payment or closing an account is a service which depositors 
expect and are entitled to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, 
inconvenience and expense. The inevitable occasional losses through failure to stop or 
close should be borne by the banks as a cost of the business of banking.”102
Commentators seem to agree that where the statute has so clearly stated that a certain 
right, such as the right to stop payment, is regarded as a fundamental part of the checking 
account relationship, an agreement that purports to eliminate that right would be 
unenforceable, even though it might be difficult to base that conclusion on the literal 
102
 U.C.C. §§ 4-403 cmt. 1.
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language of section 4-103.103  As the leading commentators on the Code put it, “We 
believe that 4-103 incorporates the standard principle that parties may not depart from 
legislative statements of public policy, that section 4-403(a) is a statement of such a
policy and that the forgoing Comment is an indication that the Code drafters did not 
intend that banks should have the right to eliminate the practice of stopping payment.”104
To bring us somewhat closer to the specific issue of the enforceability of 
facsimile signature agreements, suppose that an agreement between a bank and its 
customer contained a provision that the bank would not be liable for payment of any 
check bearing a forged drawer’s signature or forged indorsement, unless the bank failed 
to exercise ordinary care in paying the check.   The Code clearly assumes that a bank is 
liable for wrongful payment in paying a check over a forgery of the drawers’ signature or 
an indorsement.  The comments to section 4-401 state, quite explicitly and without any 
qualification, that “[a]n item containing a forged drawer’s signature or forged 
indorsement is not properly payable.”105 Is that fundamental principle subject to 
variation by agreement?
Though it is common to speak of a bank as incurring liability for paying a check 
over a forgery of the drawer’s signature or an indorsement, there is a sense in which that 
way of phrasing the point is subtly but importantly inaccurate.  Consider the precise basis 
of a customer’s claim against its bank in connection with the bank’s payment of a check 
103
 1 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 1, ¶ 3.06[1][b]; 6A HAWKLAND, supra note 1, [Rev] §§ 
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104 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 18-2 at 653.
105
 U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
66
containing a forgery of the drawer’s signature or an indorsement.  Suppose that Customer 
opens an account by a deposit of $1000 in cash.  Later, Customer seeks to withdraw the 
$1000.  Bank responds that the amount of the deposit is now zero, because Bank paid a
$1000 check from the account.  Customer responds that the check was not authorized.  
To take an extreme case, let us suppose that the facts are entirely known, that the $1000 
check charged to the account was for a check drawn by Scalawag, and that Customer had 
absolutely no connection with the drawing of the authorized check.  For example, 
suppose that Scalawag produced the check by using a photocopy machine so that 
Customer cannot even be held responsible for allowing Scalawag to get hold of a blank 
check.  What, precisely, is the basis of the Customer’s claim against the Bank?
Though it is common to speak of the bank as incurring liability for paying a check that 
was not properly payable, that is not really an accurate way of describing the situation.  
When Customer opened the account with a $1000 cash deposit, a debtor-creditor 
relationship was established.  Bank was the debtor, having incurred a liability to 
Customer for $1000.  Customer’s claim against the Bank is simply a claim to enforce that 
debt.  Customer asserts that Bank owes it $1000.  Either Customer is right or wrong, but 
Customer’s claim is based in the initial deposit.  The question of the $1000 check enters 
the story only by reason of Bank’s asserted defense that the amount of the debt is not the 
original $1000, but is now zero because the Bank has already repaid the debt by 
following Customer’s instruction embodied in the $1000 check.  If that check was not 
authorized by Customer, then Bank has failed to prove that the original $1000 debt has 
been diminished.  Customer’s claim that it is entitled to recover $1000 from Bank is not a 
liability based on negligence concepts on any related notions arising out of Bank’s 
67
payment of the $1000 check.  Rather Customer’s claim is based on the original $1000 
deposit.  Bank’s payment of the forged check enters the story only by way of an effort by 
Bank to defend the action on its $1000 debt obligation by asserting that it has already 
paid the debt.  
If we are more careful in describing the basis of a customer’s claim against its 
bank arising out of payment of an assertedly unauthorized check, it becomes quite clear 
why the customer’s claim is not based on any assertion that the bank was negligent.  
Consider a simple case in an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship where the debtor 
repays the debt to someone that the debtor reasonably, but erroneously, believes to be the 
creditor or a representative of the creditor.  The creditor then brings suit on the debt and 
the debtor seeks to defend on the grounds that it paid someone else under an honest 
mistake as to the identity or authority of the person receiving the payment.  The only 
appropriate response would be laughter.  There can be no doubt that payment made by 
mistake to wrong party does not discharge debt.106 The response would be little different 
106
 70 C.J.S. Payment § 5 (1987); 60 AM. JUR. 2d Payment § 59 (2003); Lake v. Wilson, 
35 S.W.2d 597 (Ark. 1931); Wagshal v. Selig, 403 A.2d 338 (D.C. 1979); Taylor v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 245 A.2d 426, (D.C.App.1968); Columbus 
Min. Co. v. Combs, 26 S.W.2d 26  (Ky. 1930); Fuge v. Quincy Co-op. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 
199 (Mass.1938); Levine v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 322 N.Y.S.2d 119 
(N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1971); Eaton v. Calig, 446 N.E.2d 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); 
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Video Independent Theatres, Inc., 522 P.2d 1029 (Okla. 1974); 
Gilliland v. Jones, 265 S.E.2d 263 (S.C. 1980).  The question whether the mistaken payor 
can recover from the person to whom payment was made is a difficult issue in the law of 
restitution.  See generally 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 14.1-
14.28 (1978).  That issue would be of no consequence if the mistaken payment itself 
discharged the debt, for the mistaken party would then have no concern in the matter.  
Indeed in the case commonly regarded as the starting place of the law of restitution 
permitting recovery of payment made by mistake, the fact that the mistaken payment 
cannot discharge the obligation to the actual creditor was regarded as too obvious to 
require any citation or discussion.  Bonnel v. Foulke, 82 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1657) 
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if we found, buried in the fine print of a promissory note, language that might be read to 
say that the debtor’s liability would be discharged by the debtor’s payment to any person
that the debtor honestly believed was the creditor.  Such a provision is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the basic concept of a debtor-creditor relationship.  The debtor’s 
liability is not based on fault, but on the simple fact of the making of the loan and non-
payment thereof.  Indeed, if an assertion that “something happened that made it much 
harder for me to repay the debt” were a defense to an action on a debt, there would be no 
need for a law of bankruptcy.
These considerations indicate that a provision in an account agreement that sought 
to eliminate the bank’s basic liability for the debt would be unenforceable.  So too,  an 
attempt to place the customer’s claim against the bank on something akin to a negligence 
basis should be held unenforceable on the grounds that any such provision is inconsistent
with the basic legal nature of the debtor-creditor relationship created by the opening of a 
bank account.  The fact that the Code provision on variation by agreement speaks only in 
terms of limiting a bank’s effort to disclaim responsibility for lack of good faith or 
ordinary care should be regarded as relevant primarily to those settings in which the 
concepts of ordinary care and good faith have some appropriate role to play.  Indeed, the 
precise language used in section 4-103 is entirely understandable when it is recalled that 
Article 4 had its origin in the American Bankers Association Bank Collection Code,107
(“And if I pay money in satisfaction of a debt, and he to whom it is paid has no title to 
receive it, and so the duty is not satisfied, he to whom the money is paid is thereby 
indebted to me ….”)(emphasis added).
107
 The fullest account of the tortured history of Article 4 in the U.C.C. drafting process 
can be found in Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code:  A History of the Uniform Commercial 
Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFFALO L. REV. 360, 448-64 (2001).
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which addressed only the relationship between a depositor and the collecting bank as 
agent for the depositor in attempting to collect the check.108  In that setting, the basic 
obligation of the bank to the customer is an obligation to exercise care in attempting to 
collect the deposited item.  By contrast, in the setting of the bank’s liability to its 
customer for the amount of a collected deposit, and the bank’s contention that the liability 
is diminished by a prior repayment, concepts of good faith and ordinary care have no role 
to play.  
Thus, we come to the question of how a court should react if confronted by a case 
of an assertion by a customer of an unauthorized check paid from an account governed by 
a facsimile signature agreement and a response by the bank that the agreement places on 
the customer all responsibility for unauthorized payments. Specifically, suppose that the 
facts are it appears may well have been involved in the Jefferson Park case, to wit, an 
unauthorized charge is made and the customer is prepared to introduce evidence showing 
that the unauthorized facsimile check was not produced by any person who gained access 
to blank facsimile checks or the facsimile machine from the customer, but produced the 
bogus check by some form of desktop publishing technology.  In the Jefferson Park case, 
a grant of summary judgment for the bank was affirmed, on the grounds that no factual 
issue was raised by the customer’s contention that no evidence could be produced that the 
customer was in any way negligent.  That ruling is correct only if a facsimile signature 
agreement is enforceable even if it places on the customer the risk of loss from wholly 
unpreventable forgeries that occur through means not involving any fault on the part of 
108
 The text of the A.B.A. Bank Collection Code can be found in 3 THOMAS B. PATON, 
PATON’S DIGEST §27 (1942).
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the customer or any use of the customer’s facilities.  Yet, as we have seen, an agreement 
placing on the customer the risk of loss for wholly unpreventable forgeries is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the law of all payment systems, as well as with the basic 
debtor-creditor nature of the bank-customer relationship.  Accordingly, insofar as it 
appears to say that no relevant fact issue was raised by the customer’s contention that the 
unauthorized facsimile check was produced by means not involving any negligence by 
the customer, the Jefferson Park opinion is erroneous and should not be followed.
A somewhat more difficult question is presented by the circumstance that the 
customary form of facsimile signature agreement appears on its face to place the risk of 
loss on the customer regardless of the circumstances that resulted in the drawing of the 
unauthorized check.  One can imagine many circumstances in which a check bearing a 
facsimile signature is produced as a result of some lack of care by the customer in 
safeguarding the facsimile signature machine or blank checks on the account.  In the 
circumstances involved in many of the cases concerning facsimile checks, it appears that 
the customer bore some responsibility for a lack of care in safeguarding the machine or 
checks.  In those cases, there seems to be little doubt that an agreement placing 
responsibility for the loss on the customer should be enforceable, for the only effect of 
the agreement is to particularize the general rule that would govern the case in any event, 
to wit that the customer is precluded from denying the authenticity of a signature if the 
customer’s lack of care substantially contributed to the making of the unauthorized 
signature.109
109
 U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
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One approach that a court might take is to rule that a facsimile signature 
agreement is simply unenforceable if it is drafted so broadly that it would impose the risk 
of loss on the customer even if the customer’s conduct is entirely uninvolved.  There is 
substantial support for that approach as a general issue of contract interpretation.  Section 
184 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that:
(1) If less than all of an agreement is unenforceable [as contrary to 
public policy] a court may nevertheless enforce the rest of the agreement 
in favor of a party who did not engage in serious misconduct if the 
performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential 
part of the agreed exchange.
(2) A court may treat only part of a term an unenforceable under 
the rule stated in Subsection (1) if the party who seeks to enforce the term 
obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of 
fair dealing.
The commentary to this section provides some support for a contention that a court 
should decline to engage in an effort to reconstruct the typical form of facsimile signature 
agreement to separate the enforceable from the unenforceable:
Sometimes a term is unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
because it is too broad, even though a narrower term would be 
enforceable. In such a situation, under Subsection (2), the court may refuse 
to enforce only part of the term, while enforcing the other part of the term 
as well as the rest of the agreement. The court's power in such a case is not 
a power of reformation, however, and it will not, in the course of 
determining what part of the term to enforce, add to the scope of the term 
in any way. A court will not exercise this discretion in favor of a party 
unless it appears that he made the agreement in good faith and in 
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. … For example, a 
court will not aid a party who has taken advantage of his dominant 
bargaining power to extract from the other party a promise that is clearly 
so broad as to offend public policy by redrafting the agreement so as to 
make a part of the promise enforceable. The fact that the term is contained 
in a standard form supplied by the dominant party argues against aiding 
him in this request.110
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 cmt. B (1979)
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A ruling that the facsimile agreement is unenforceable as an overbroad agreement would 
not, of course, leave the bank with liability for all unauthorized facsimile signature 
checks.  Rather, a ruling that the agreement is unenforceable as overbroad would mean 
only that the question whether the bank can charge the customer’s account for the check 
is governed by the usual statutory rules.  The customer would begin with an assertion that 
the signature was not genuine.  The bank could respond with the usual statutory rule that 
the customer can be precluded from denying authenticity if the customer’s “failure to 
exercise ordinary care substantially contributes … to the making of a forged
signature.”111
It is, however, somewhat difficult to square that approach with the many cases on 
facsimile signatures.  There appears to be little variation in the wording of the facsimile 
signature agreements involved in the cases.  All could, on their face, be read to impose on 
the customer to risk of loss even in a case in which the customer’s conduct in no way 
contributed to the making of the unauthorized signature.112  Yet, there are many cases in 
which facsimile signature agreement have been enforced in circumstances where it  
appears that the wrongdoer was an employee of the customer or in some fashion did gain 
access to the facsimile checks or machine from the customer.113  To be sure, the 
111
 U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
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 For example, the resolution in the Perini case authorized the payor banks to “honor all 
checks … when bearing or purporting to bear the single facsimile signature … regardless 
of by whom or by what means the actual or purported facsimile signature thereon may 
have been affixed thereto, if such facsimile signature resembles the facsimile specimen 
from time to time filed with said banks.”  
113
 See TAN 6-23.
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contention that the usual form of facsimile signature resolution is fatally overbroad was 
not raised in the cases upholding the application of such resolutions to ordinary cases of 
insider fraud, so it is possible that a court could rule that the issue remains open.  It does, 
however, seems more consistent with the many years of cases on facsimile signatures to 
forge an approach under which the resolutions could be upheld and applied in the 
ordinary insider fraud cases, yet leave it open to the customer to show that in a particular 
case its conduct in no way contributed to the making of the unauthorized signature.
At the very minimum, a court confronted with the issue should forge an approach 
consistent with the rules recently developed in Article 4A for electronic funds transfers.  
As has been noted above, under the Article 4A rules an electronic funds transfer can be 
charged to the customer’s account provided that the charge was made in accordance with 
a commercially reasonable security procedure, but the customer can shift the loss to the 
bank
if the customer proves that the order was not caused, directly or indirectly, 
by a person (i) entrusted at any time with duties to act for the customer 
with respect to payment orders or the security procedure, or (ii) who 
obtained access to transmitting facilities of the customer or who obtained, 
from a source controlled by the customer and without authority of the 
receiving bank, information facilitating breach of the security procedure, 
regardless of how the information was obtained or whether the customer 
was at fault114
The use of facsimile signatures on checks is so common that there should be no issue of 
whether an arrangement for payment of checks with facsimile signatures is a 
“commercially reasonable security procedure.”  Thus, the ordinary form of facsimile 
signature agreement would be given effect insofar as it places on the customer the initial 
114
 U.C.C. § 4A-203
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risk of loss for any check that bears a signature that “resembles” the authorized facsimile 
signature.  Yet, drawing on the Article 4A rule, that initial allocation of the burden of
proof would not preclude a showing by the customer that in the particular case the 
unauthorized facsimile signature was made by an outsider who was not assisted in the 
fraud by anyone from the customer’s enterprise.  For example, the customer would be 
permitted to show that the facsimile signature was made by someone who simply got 
hold of a genuine check and used desktop publishing facilities to use it as a model for 
checks that appeared to be genuine but were produced by means entirely unconnected 
with the customer’s operations.
A court might, however, reasonably conclude that the allocation of burden of 
proof adopted in Article 4A is not necessarily appropriate for cases involving ordinary 
checks.  The expected case of wholesale wire transfer fraud is likely to involve 
significant sums of money.  The comments to Article 4A indicate that the allocation of 
burden of proof in that context was based on the assumption that in criminal investigation 
of wire transfer fraud was likely and would ordinarily produce significant evidence about 
the causes of the fraud that could be used by the customer in any dispute with the bank.115
115
 U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 5:
Because of bank regulation requirements, in this kind of case there will 
always be a criminal investigation as well as an internal investigation of 
the bank to determine the probable explanation for the breach of security. 
Because a funds transfer fraud usually will involve a very large amount of 
money, both the criminal investigation and the internal investigation are 
likely to be thorough. In some cases there may be an investigation by bank 
examiners as well. Frequently, these investigations will develop evidence 
of who is at fault and the cause of the loss. The customer will have access 
to evidence developed in these investigations and that evidence can be 
used by the customer in meeting its burden of proof. 
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A check fraud case might involve an amount of money that might be modest from the 
standpoint of the bank or public authorities—though not from the standpoint of the 
customer.  Accordingly, it may be thought more problematic to adopt an allocation of 
burden of proof that relies on the assumption of a significant public investigation.  Rather 
a court might place on the bank the burden of proving that the fraud was, more likely than 
not, attributable to someone within the organization of the customer.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The problem of the enforceability of facsimile signature agreements thus raises 
important questions both about the basic principles of the check payment system and the 
role of courts in policing agreements concerning checking accounts.  As we have seen, 
the only explicit textual basis for judicial policing of such agreements is the rule in § 4-
103(a) that an agreement cannot “disclaim a bank’s responsibility for its own lack of 
good faith;” where good faith is defined as “honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”116  Although the definition of “good 
faith” appears to establish a unitary standard applicable throughout the Code, further 
examination reveals that judicial policing of agreements under the good faith standard 
must take account of the very different approaches to agreements taken in different 
articles of the Code.  If the statute itself has established clear limits on the extent to which 
agreements can vary statutory rules, as in the case of the many provisions in Article 4A 
116
 U.C.C. § 4-102© & 3-103(a)(4).
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that cannot be varied by agreement,117 then it may be appropriate to give a relatively 
limited role to the concept of good faith as a policing tool.  On the other hand, if the 
statute has not itself undertaken the task of establishing limits on variation by agreement, 
as in the case of Article 4, then the courts must inevitably be open to more serious 
consideration of contentions that in a particular case an agreement would alter 
fundamental rules on which the Article 4 structure is based, and thus cannot be 
enforceable.
117 See TAN 88-92.
